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Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, virtual avatars have become a popular research tool in 
psychology and neuroscience for studying social cognition. As opposed to 
photographs or movie recordings of actual human beings, avatars allow for the precise 
control over all aspects of the stimulus, ranging from the avatar's gaze and movement 
behavior to its physical appearance, such as age, gender, or ethnicity (Vogeley & 
Bente, 2010). Additionally, avatars have made it possible to create interactive 
paradigms that enable the study of social interactions in real-time (Wilms et al., 
2010). Benefitting from this recent development, the present thesis set out to use 
avatars to study social cognition in two areas: cross-cultural psychology and high-
functioning autism. The unifying connection between the four studies combined in 
this thesis is that they all rely on specific advantages offered by avatars and that they 
could not have been conducted without them. 
The basic structure of the thesis is as follows: Study 1 lays the methodological 
ground for the other three studies (Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4) by testing the 
validity of avatars in a trust game. Once the validity of avatars has been established, 
they are used to tackle particular demands in the study of social cognition in cross-
cultural psychology and high-functioning autism.  
The goal of Study 1 was to test whether virtual avatars can produce similar 
behavioral responses as photographs of actual human beings. Even though there are 
many studies that show that avatars can lead to similar impressions as photographs or 
videos (e.g., Moser et al., 2007), only few studies so far have tested if avatars also 
lead to similar behavioral responses. As two studies have shown, the differences 
between avatars and real human beings can be subtle. In a study on the perception of 
nonverbal behavior, Bente et al. (2001) investigated whether observers form similar 
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impressions based on animated avatars as opposed to video recordings of nonverbal 
behavior. The results showed that impression ratings did not differ between avatars 
and video recordings. However, eye-tracking results revealed that participants focused 
less attention on the faces of the avatars as opposed to the faces of the humans in the 
videos. In a study on interpersonal trust, Riedl et al. (2011) could show that 
participants trusted virtual avatars in a similar way as other humans. However, fMRI 
results revealed a reduced activity in the mentalizing network when participants 
interacted with an avatar as opposed to a human. 
Based on these two findings, Study 1 set out to devise a more rigorous test for 
the validity of avatars by assessing participants' behavioral trust in avatars. First, by 
letting participants play a trust game for actual money, it was tested whether 
impressions of avatars translate into behavioral trust when actual money is at stake. 
Second, by combining avatars with another objective information source, it was tested 
whether avatars still have an effect on decision making if other more objective 
information is available. The results of Study 1 show that humans trust avatars in a 
similar way as they trust other human beings, supporting the validity of avatars in the 
study of psychological phenomena. The results, however, also hint at subtle 
differences between avatars and humans. When combined with another source of 
information, avatars have a slightly weaker effect than photographs of actual humans. 
As the validity of avatars has been established in Study 1, they are used to 
tackle particular demands in the study of social cognition in cross-cultural psychology 
and high-functioning autism (Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4). Taken together, all 
three studies (Study 2 to Study 4) make use of the unique features that avatars offer 
researchers. 
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Study 2 investigated the influence of two sources of information—factual 
information and tacit, social cues—on decision making in an intercultural trust game 
with participants form an individualistic (Germany) and a collectivistic culture 
(United Arab Emirates). For Study 2, a database of Arab and German avatars was 
developed that controlled for all facial features except the avatar's ethnicity. 
Therefore, the results of the final study cannot be attributed to confounding factors, 
such as facial expressions.  
In Study 3, two features of avatars were used: precise control over the avatar's 
movement behavior and interactive control of the avatar through the participants. To 
study the ability to detect direct gaze in high-functioning autism, a gaze sequence 
consisting of direct gaze and slightly averted gaze was programmed and displayed by 
a virtual avatar, taking into consideration even small degrees of deviation. Such a 
stimulus sequence would not have been possible to create using conventional 
techniques, such as video recordings or photographs. As the results show, the 
methodology was successful at uncovering subtle impairments in the detection of 
direct gaze by individuals with autism that would have otherwise been left undetected. 
To further explore whether the impaired ability to perceive direct gaze in high-
functioning autism could be explained by an aversive reaction towards uncontrollable 
gaze, a virtual avatar was created whose gaze could be controlled by the participants. 
Correspondingly, such an interactive paradigm could not have been realized using 
conventional means. As the results show, the methodology was successful at showing 
that individuals with high-functioning autism can overcome part of their impairment 
in detecting direct gaze when given active control over the social gaze of the avatar. 
For Study 4, a database of attractive and unattractive avatars was developed. 
Because previous studies with heterogeneous facial stimuli had shown conflicting 
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results with regard to the ability to detect attractiveness by individuals with autism 
(Da Fonseca, Santos, Rosset, & Deruelle, 2011; White, Hill, Winston, & Frith, 2006), 
it was crucial to develop a homogenous stimulus set free of possible confounding 
factors. In addition, because the study also used eye-tracking to record participants 
visual attention to different facial areas, facial stimuli had to be free of artifacts that 
could distract participants gaze. The final stimulus set consisted of faces that only 
differed with regard to attractiveness and kept all other influence factors constant—
facial expressions of all avatars were neutral and the gaze direct. The results show that 
individuals with high-functioning autism are impaired in their ability to detect 
attractiveness. 
Goal of the Present Thesis 
As a whole, the aim of the present thesis is to advance knowledge in two 
major fields of social cognition—cross-cultural psychology and high-functioning 
autism—by using virtual avatars. Study 1 assessed the validity of social avatars as a 
research tool. Study 2 focused on cross-cultural differences in trust. Study 3 and 
Study 4 investigated whether two core abilities of social cognition—detection of 
direct gaze and perception of attractiveness—are impaired in individuals with high-
functioning autism. 
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Study 1: Do You Trust My Avatar? 
Introduction 
Despite their widespread use in science and on the web, only few studies so 
far have compared the effects of virtual avatars to humans (e.g., Moser et al., 2007). 
In a study focusing on the perception of nonverbal behavior, Bente et al. (2001) could 
show that virtual avatars displaying nonverbal behavior produced the same 
impressions as the original videos that the movements of the avatars had been 
transcribed from. However, results of eye-tracking revealed that participants focused 
less attention on the faces of the avatars and more on the body as compared to the 
original videos. In a different study, Riedl et al. (2011) could show that participants 
trusted virtual avatars in a similar way as other humans. However, fMRI results 
revealed a reduced activity in the mentalizing network when participants interacted 
with an avatar as opposed to a human. Taken together, both studies show that virtual 
avatars can have similar effects as real humans. Nevertheless, they also hint at subtle 
differences in the response to avatars that should be further investigated. The goal of 
the present study was to further explore whether virtual avatars are trusted in a similar 
way as humans. 
A recent study by Bente et al. (2012) provides a framework to study trust in 
online transactions. Using a standard trust-game (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004), 
Bente et al. (2012) could show that both reputation scores and seller photographs—
two information sources often found on e-commerce websites—had an independent 
influence on buyers' trust and purchase decisions. The aim of the present study was to 
investigate whether the results of the study by Bente et al. (2012) could be replicated 
with virtual avatars. Additionally, the present study also investigated whether 
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participants' involvement in the trust game would influence the effect of seller avatars 
on purchase decisions. 
 
Experiment 1 
Background and Hypotheses  
Reputation. One key problem that every website offering an open market 
place for its users must solve is how to establish trust between sellers and buyers. 
Because both parties usually do not meet in person, everyday heuristics used to 
establish trust cannot be applied. To solve this problem, almost all of the major 
websites (e.g., eBay, Amazon) have adopted reputation systems—usually in the form 
of a five-star-index—that give users the ability to quickly assess the trustworthiness 
of their potential business partners. As a large body of studies has shown, reputation 
scores can effectively increase trust among sellers and buyers and thus boost the 
number of successful transactions (e.g., Diekmann, Jann, & Wyder, 2007; Gregg & 
Scott, 2006). In their study, Bente et al. (2012) did find a significant effect of 
reputation scores on purchase decisions. Positive reputation lead to higher purchase 
rates than both negative reputation and missing reputation. Additionally, negative 
reputation led to significantly higher purchase rates than missing information, 
indicating that the uncertainty of missing information may be more aversive than the 
information conveyed by the negative reputation score (Bente et al., 2012). In line 
with the results by Bente et al. (2012), the following hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Reputation scores influence purchase decisions in online 
transactions. Positive reputation leads to higher purchase rates than 
both negative and missing reputation (H1a.) Negative reputation leads 
to higher purchase rates than missing reputation (H1b). 
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Seller avatars. In addition to reputation scores, seller representations, such as 
photographs, are another source of information that can help to increase trust. For 
instance, Jones et al. (1998) could show that photos of sellers could positively 
influence buyers' trust and purchase decisions. However, seller photographs can also 
activate stereotypes and have a negative effect on trust building if they depict 
members of minorities (Doleac & Stein, 2010). For instance, Ayres et al. (2011) 
found that eBay products accompanied by photographs of African Americans sold for 
20% less than products accompanied by Caucasians. Taken together, these results 
show that the effects of photographs in e-commerce—both positive and negative—are 
similar to real-life interactions. Bente et al. (2012) found that trustworthy photos led 
to higher purchase rates than untrustworthy photos. Contrary to the results on the 
effect of missing reputation, Bente et al. (2012) did not find a difference in purchase 
rates between untrustworthy photos and missing photos. Regarding the effect of 
avatars on purchase decisions, the following hypotheses are stated based on the results 
by Bente et al. (2012): 
Hypothesis 2: Seller avatars influence purchase behavior in online 
transactions. Trustworthy seller avatars lead to higher purchase rates 
than both untrustworthy and missing avatars (H2a). Untrustworthy and 
missing avatars do not differ in purchase rates. (H2b). 
 
Involvement. According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986), decisions can be influenced by two different pathways or routes of 
information processing: the peripheral and the central route. When humans use the 
peripheral route, they are easily influenced by superficial cues, such as the 
attractiveness or supposed expertise of the information source. When humans use the 
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central route, they process the available information in great detail and try to make 
rational decisions. Humans generally use the central route, when they are highly 
involved in the decision to be made and cognitive resources are available. When the 
involvement in the decision is low and cognitive resources are scarce, participants use 
the peripheral route. From a rational perspective, the best strategy in the trust game 
would be to solely rely on the reputation scores and to ignore the seller photographs 
because the reputation scores as opposed to the seller photographs represent an 
objective measure of the sellers' cooperativeness. In their original study, Bente et al. 
(2012) found equal effect sizes for reputation (η²p = .27) and seller photographs (η²p = 
.20), indicating that participants were equally influenced in their decisions by tacit, 
social cues (seller photos) and factual information (reputation scores). One possible 
explanation for this may be that participants' involvement in the trust game was low, 
which caused them to use a shallow mode of processing, thus giving both cues equal 
weight in their decisions. One goal of the present study was to investigate whether 
participants' could be influenced to use the central route of information processing 
and thus decrease the influence of seller avatars on purchase decisions. In order to 
vary the involvement of the participants in this study, the present study varied the 
amount of virtual units at stake in the trust game. In the high involvement condition 
(high amount at stake), it was expected that participants would use the central route of 
processing based on factual information (reputation scores). In the low involvement 
condition (low amount at stake), it was expected that participants would use the 
peripheral route based on tacit cues (seller avatars). Therefore, it was hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3: Involvement and seller avatar show an interaction effect. 
High involvement leads to a weaker influence of seller avatars on 
purchase decisions (H3). 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   18 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 126 students (66 male, 60 female; Mage = 24.15, SDage 
= 5.66) participated in the online trust game. Participants were invited via email to 
take part in an online trust game in which they could earn between 5 and 7.25 Euros. 
Emails were distributed through mailing lists of the University of Cologne. 
Design. The influence of avatars, reputation scores, and involvement on 
purchase decisions was analyzed in a 3 × 3 × 2 design, with avatar (trustworthy vs. 
untrustworthy vs. no avatar) and reputation (positive vs. negative vs. no reputation) as 
within-subjects factors and involvement (high vs. low) as a between-subjects factor. 
Stimulus materials.  
Trust game . The standard trust game by Bolton (2004) provided the 
framework for the present study. In this trust game, a buyer (trustor) has to decide 
whether he will trust a seller (trustee) and buy a product from him/her. However, 
instead of actual products buyer and seller only exchange virtual units that are 
converted into real money at the end of the experiment. All possible decisions and 
outcomes of the trust game are shown in the pay-off matrix (see Figure 1). If the 
buyer decides not to buy (Case 1), both buyer and seller keep their 35 units. If the 
buyer decides to buy and the seller ships the product (Case 2a), both buyer and seller 
receive 50 units for the successful trade. If the buyer decides to buy and the seller 
does not ship the product (Case 2b), the buyer loses his/her 35 units to the seller, who 
receives 70 units. 
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Figure 1. Pay-off matrix for the trust game showing all possible decisions and 
outcomes. 
Seller avatars. To select appropriate avatars for the study, 30 virtual avatars 
(15 male, 15 female) were created using the software FaceGen (Singular Inversions, 
2011). In a prestudy, 35 participants (8 male, 27 female; Mage = 27.00, SDage = 6.76) 
rated the trustworthiness of the avatars on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very 
untrustworthy) to 7 (very trustworthy). Based on the trustratings in the prestudy, six 
trustworthy and six untrustworthy avatars were selected for the study. On average, the 
six trustworthy avatars (M = 4.59, SD = 0.82) were rated to be significantly more 
trustworthy than the six untrustworthy avatars (M = 2.71, SD = 0.86), t(34) = 8.69, p 
< .001, d = 1.48. The remaining avatars were used in filler trials. 
Reputation scores. The reputation of the sellers was symbolized using a 
reputation index with five stars—with the number of stars representing the percentage 
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of previous trades in which the seller had shipped the product after receiving the 
payment (one star: 0–20%; two stars: 21–40%; three stars: 41–60%; four stars: 61–
80%; five stars: 81–100%). Appropriate reputation scores were selected based on the 
prestudy by Bente et al. (2012): 30 participants (16 male, 14 female) rated the 
trustworthiness of the different levels of the reputation score on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very untrustworthy) to 7 (very trustworthy). Based on the results of 
the prestudy, two of the star-indexes were selected for the study: Three stars (the 
seller shipped the product 41–60% of the time) led to a significantly lower trust rating 
(M = 2.90, SD = 1.30) than four stars (the seller shipped the product 61–80% the 
time), t(29) = 8.95, p < .001, d = 1.70. 
Involvement. Participants' involvement in the trust game was modified 
through the amount of units at stake in the game. In the low involvement condition, 
both buyer and seller received a basic amount of 35 units. In the high involvement 
condition, the amount was raised to 3500 units. Participants were randomly assigned 
to the high or low involvement condition. 
Procedure. All participants completed the study online using their own 
computers. At the beginning of the study, participants were informed that they would 
now play an online trust game with buyers and sellers, and that they their own role in 
the trust game would be determined randomly. On the next page, participants were 
informed that they had been randomly assigned the role of the buyer—all participants 
were assigned the role of the buyer—and that they would now play the trust game 
with several other players who had been assigned the role of the seller. Participants 
were then informed that the sellers would be represented through virtual avatars 
generated out of real photographs. Two photographs and their avatars were provided 
as examples. Participants were further informed that in some cases the avatar would 
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not be available. After that, participants were introduced to the five-star reputation 
score. Again, participants were told that sometimes the reputation score would not be 
available. Participants were then informed that they would not receive immediate 
feedback on the decisions of the sellers, but that their final earnings would be 
calculated based on the decisions of the sellers. After that, participants proceeded to 
the actual profiles of the sellers that included the sellers' avatar and reputation, and 
decided for each profile whether they would buy from that particular seller (see 
Figure 2 for a sample profile). 
 
 
Figure 2. Screenshot of the profile of one seller in the trust game, showing a 
trustworthy avatar with a high reputation score (four stars) in the low involvement 
condition (35 units at stake).  
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Participants then completed 15 experimental trials and 14 filler trials (four 
filler trials in the beginning, eight filler trials randomly mixed with the experimental 
trials, and two filler trials at the end). Filler trials always used reputation scores other 
than three or four and were included to distract participants from the repeated 
presentation of reputation scores three and four. After participants had completed all 
trials, they were thanked for their participation and issued an anonymous code that 
allowed them to collect their earnings. Payment was calculated based on participants' 
decisions in the trust game. If participants had decided to buy the product, payment 
was always calculated as if the seller had shipped the product. Final payment to 
participants ranged from 5.07 to 6.95 Euros (M = 6.05, SD = 0.32). 
Results and Discussion 
Effect of involvement. Buying decisions were analyzed in a 3 × 3 × 2 mixed 
ANOVA (avatar × reputation × involvement). There was neither a significant main 
effect of involvement nor any significant interactions between involvement and the 
other variables, F < 1. Thus, hypothesis H3 could not be supported. The degree of 
involvement did not influence participants' buying decisions. 
Effect of avatar and reputation. Because there was no significant main 
effect of involvement, data of both conditions were combined into one single group. 
Then, buying decisions were analyzed in a 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA (avatar 
× reputation). There was a significant main effect of avatar, F(2, 250) = 39.57, p < 
.001, η²p = .240, a significant main effect of reputation, F(2, 250) = 124.58, p < .001, 
η²p = .499, and a significant interaction effect between avatar and reputation, F(4, 
500) = 3.66, p = .006, η²p = .028. The results are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Effects of reputation and avatar on purchase decisions. 
To break down these effects, pairwise comparisons were performed. 
Reputation scores did significantly affect purchase behavior in online 
transactions. Positive reputation lead to higher purchase rates than negative and 
missing reputation, supporting hypothesis H1a. In addition, negative reputation lead 
to higher purchase rates than missing reputation, supporting hypothesis H1b (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Results of Post-hoc Comparisons for Reputation 
Avatar Reputation t(125) p Cohen's d 
No Negative vs. No  5.35 < .001 0.48 
 Positive vs. No 12.39 < .001 1.10 
 Positive vs. Negative  7.45 < .001 0.67 
Untrustworthy Negative vs. No  5.52 < .001 0.50 
 Positive vs. No 13.51 < .001 1.21 
 Positive vs. Negative  7.19 < .001 0.64 
Trustworthy Negative vs. No  6.15 < .001 0.55 
 Positive vs. No 10.63 < .001 0.98 
 Positive vs. Negative  5.25 < .001 0.49 
 
Seller avatars also had a significant effect on purchase behavior in online 
transactions. Trustworthy seller avatars lead to higher purchase rates than 
untrustworthy or missing avatars, supporting hypothesis H2a. There was no difference 
in purchase rates between avatars with an untrustworthy appearing seller or missing 
avatars, supporting H2b (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Results of Post-hoc Comparisons for Avatar 
Reputation Avatar t(125) p Cohen's d 
No Untrustworthy vs. No 0.75   .455 0.07 
 Trustworthy vs. No 5.71 < .001 0.51 
 Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy 5.77 < .001 0.52 
Negative Untrustworthy vs. No 0.37   .714 0.03 
 Trustworthy vs. No 6.07 < .001 0.55 
 Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy 6.32 < .001 0.56 
Positive Untrustworthy vs. No 0.82   .415  0.07 
 Trustworthy vs. No 2.75   .007 0.26 
 Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy 4.43 < .001 0.41 
 
As for the combined effect of reputation and seller avatars, there was a 
significant interaction between reputation and seller avatars. In their original study, 
Bente et al. (2012) did not find a significant interaction between reputation and seller 
photographs, which they interpreted as evidence for the independent influence of both 
cues on purchase decisions. The results of the present study, however, hint at an 
important difference in the effect of seller photographs as opposed to seller avatars: In 
the study by Bente et al. (2012) the effect of the seller photographs was independent 
of the effect of reputation. In the present study, the effect of the seller avatars differed 
with the levels of reputation. In the negative reputation condition, where there was 
high uncertainty whether the seller would ship the product (only 41–60% of the time), 
participants were more susceptible to the influence of the seller avatars. In the 
positive reputation condition, where there was high certainty that the seller would ship 
the product (61–80% of the time), the influence of the seller avatars was weaker. This 
suggests that even though participants do use seller avatars in their decision process, 
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they give less weight to this cue as opposed to reputation scores. This is also 
supported by the larger effect size for reputation (η²p = .499) as opposed to seller 
avatars (η²p = .240). However, if the reputation is negative, participants rely more 
strongly on seller avatars in their decisions. Because this interaction effect was not 
predicted, Experiment 2 was conducted to replicate the interaction between reputation 
and seller avatars. 
Experiment 2 
Background and Hypotheses 
As the results of Experiment 1 have shown, there was a significant interaction 
effect between reputation and trustworthiness of the seller avatar. More precisely, the 
effect of avatar was stronger if there was high uncertainty that the seller would ship 
the product. If the uncertainty that the seller would ship the product was low, the 
effect of the trustworthiness of the avatar was weaker. However, Experiment 1 
suffered from one major limitation: Reputation score number 3 was both more 
negative and represented a higher uncertainty than reputation score number 4 —thus 
confounding negativity and uncertainty. To rule out this possibility, Experiment 1 was 
replicated using all five reputation scores. Especially reputation scores 1 (seller 
shipped 0–20% of the time) and 2 (seller shipped 21–40% of the time) are important 
in this context because they are more negative than reputation score number 3 but 
represent less uncertainty—it is certain that the seller will not ship the product. 
Therefore, to replicate the effect and to rule out other explanations, Experiment 2 was 
performed. Based on the results of Experiment 1, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of seller avatars is strongest in the condition 
with the highest uncertainty that the seller will ship the product 
compared to all other conditions. 
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Methods 
Participants. Overall, 147 students (21 male, 126 female; Mage = 23.88, SDage 
= 4.56) participated in the online trust game. Participants were recruited through 
email invitations sent via mailing lists of several universities in Germany. Participants 
were invited to play an online trust game in which they could earn between 7 and 10 
Euros. 
Design. To analyze the interaction between reputation scores and 
trustworthiness of the seller avatars, I used a 2 (avatar: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) 
× 5 (reputation: 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 vs. 5 stars) design, with both avatar and reputation 
as within-subjects factors. 
Stimulus materials. Based on the pretest of Experiment 1, ten trustworthy 
and ten untrustworthy avatars were selected. On average, the ten trustworthy avatars 
(M = 4.35, SD = 0.62) were rated to be significantly more trustworthy than the ten 
untrustworthy avatars (M = 3.01, SD = 0.77), t(34) = 8.45, p < .001, d = 1.43. The 
remaining avatars were used in filler trials. 
To vary the reputation of the sellers, the same five-star-index as in Experiment 
1 was used. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. Payment ranged 
from 7.00 to 10.00 Euros (M = 8.52, SD = 0.39). 
Results and Discussion 
Effect of avatar and reputation. To analyze the effect of reputation and 
avatar on purchase decisions, I performed a 2 × 5 repeated-measures ANOVA (avatar 
× reputation). There was a significant main effect of avatar on purchase decisions, 
F(1, 146) = 28.5, p < .001, η²p = .163. There was a significant main effect of 
reputation on purchase decisions, F(4, 584) = 517.6, p < .001, η²p = .780. There was a 
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significant interaction effect between avatar and reputation, F(4, 584) = 3.7, p = .006, 
η²p = .024. 
To break down this significant interaction effect, I subtracted the mean 
purchase decisions for the untrustworthy avatars from the mean purchase decisions 
for the trustworthy avatars for each of the five levels of reputation (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Difference in purchase decisions between trustworthy and untrustworthy 
avatars for all five levels of reputation. 
To test the specific hypothesis that the difference in purchase decisions 
between trustworthy and untrustworthy avatars should be largest for the reputation 
score with the highest uncertainty that the seller would ship the product, I used a 
Helmert contrast. The difference in purchase decisions between trustworthy and 
untrustworthy avatars for the reputation score with the highest uncertainty (3 stars: 
41–60 %) was compared to the mean difference in purchase decisions between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy avatars of all other reputation scores (1, 2, 4, and 5 
stars). As predicted, this contrast was significant, F(1, 146) = 6.26, p = .013, η²p = 
.041, supporting hypothesis H4, which states that the effect of the seller avatar should 
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be strongest in the condition with highest uncertainty that the seller would ship the 
product. 
General Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether people trust avatars in 
a similar way as they trust photographs in an e-commerce setting. Using the paradigm 
by Bente et al. (2012), the present study replicated the main effects found by Bente et 
al. (2012) for seller reputation and seller avatar: Both positive reputation and 
trustworthy avatars led to higher purchase rates than negative reputation and 
untrustworthy avatars. With regard to missing information, the results of the present 
study also mirror the results by Bente et al. (2012). Negative reputation still led to 
significantly higher purchase rates than missing information, indicating that the 
uncertainty of missing information may be more aversive than the information 
conveyed by the negative reputation score (Bente et al., 2012). In line with the results 
by Bente et al. (2012), untrustworthy avatars did no differ significantly from missing 
avatars. 
Based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the 
present study also investigated whether participants' involvement—varied by the 
amount of units at stake in each trial—would influence the effect of seller avatars on 
purchase decisions. More precisely, it was hypothesized that when the stakes are high 
participants would use a central route of information processing relying more on 
reputation scores as opposed to seller avatars. However, the amount of units at stake 
in each trial (35 units vs. 3500 units) did not influence purchase decisions. This may 
be in part due to the fact that the conversion rate for each condition was adjusted (1:2 
in the low involvement condition and 1:200 in the high involvement condition) so that 
the actual amount of money at stake in each trial (17.5 cents) was the same across the 
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two different involvement conditions. Therefore, future studies investigating the 
influence of participants' involvement on purchase decisions should also vary the 
actual amount of money at stake. 
Nevertheless, the present study did find some subtle difference in the effect of 
avatars as compared to photographs. In contrast to the results by Bente et al. (2012), 
the present study did find an interaction effect between seller avatar and reputation 
score: The effect of the avatar was stronger if there was high uncertainty that the 
seller would ship the product—as was the case in the negative reputation condition. If 
the uncertainty that the seller would ship the product was low—as was the case in the 
positive reputation condition—, the effect of the trustworthiness of the avatar was 
weaker. Supporting this notion, the effect size for reputation was greater (η²p = .499) 
than the effect size for avatar (η²p = .240), indicating that the effect of seller avatars 
was weaker than the effect of reputation. Hinting at an important difference in the 
effect of seller avatars as opposed to seller photographs, this result is in contrast to the 
findings by Bente et al. (2012) who found similar effect sizes for reputation (η² = .27) 
and seller photographs (η² = .20). However, as shown by the significant interaction 
between reputation and seller avatars in both Experiment 1 and 2, participants' 
responses to seller avatars were influenced by the uncertainty inherent in the 
reputation scores. When the uncertainty that the seller would ship the product was 
high, participants were more susceptible to the influence of the seller avatars. As the 
results show, there are subtle differences in the effects of virtual avatars as opposed to 
photographs. The present study therefore shows for the first time that avatars can 
produce different behavioral trust than real photographs. In a previous study, Riedl et 
al. (2011) could show a reduced activity in the mentalizing network when participants 
interacted with an avatar as opposed to a human. However, contrary to the findings of 
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the present study, Riedl et al. (2011) did not find any differences between avatars and 
humans with regard to behavioral trust. The results of the present study show that the 
behavioral differences between avatars and humans can be subtle and may only be 
detectable when avatars are combined with other information sources. 
In sum, the present study shows that in online transactions we are influenced 
by both reputation scores and seller avatars in our decisions. However, the effect of 
seller avatars can be moderated by reputation scores. The findings of the present study 
support the notion that seller avatars can serve as cues to build trust in online 
transactions, but that reputation scores have a greater impact on purchase decisions 
than avatars. 
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Study 2: Cultures of Trust 
Introduction 
Generalized trust is one of the corner stones of society (Knight, 2001). On a 
macro-level, high levels of trust are related to a society's productivity and economic 
success (Beugelsdijk, De Groot, & Van Schaik, 2004); on an individual level, trust 
has a positive effect on subjective well-being (Hudson, 2006). Generally, people can 
make their decision on whom to trust based on two sources of information: factual 
information or tacit cues. In the past, trust has been mostly studied from an economic 
viewpoint with a strong focus on humans as rational actors that use objective 
information from past interactions to decide when and whom to trust (e.g., Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). However, contrary to traditional economic theories 
stating that humans as rational actors should only be influenced by factual 
information, a large body of psychological studies has shown that humans are also 
strongly influenced by tacit, social cues. These social cues can lead to fast 
impressions of trustworthiness that have a strong impact on influential decisions. For 
instance, Willis and Todorov (2006) could show that exposure to a face for only 100 
ms was sufficient for participants to form judgments of trustworthiness. Underlining 
the influence of such snap judgments, Ballew and Todorov (2007) showed that the 
trustworthiness of political candidates strongly predicted their success in elections—
candidates who looked more trustworthy received more votes than candidates who 
looked less trustworthy.  
In a recent study combining research from both the economic and 
psychological tradition on trust research, Bente et al. (2012) could show that German 
participants in an online trust game did use both sources of information—factual 
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information and tacit, social cues—equally when deciding which sellers to trust, 
hinting at a general tendency to give equal weight to both sources of information. 
However, as cross-cultural research of the past 30 years has shown, culture 
does have a strong influence on behavior and cognition (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), 
and even basic processes of cognition and perception are influenced by culture (e.g., 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005). As recent 
studies using the prisoners' dilemma paradigm have shown (e.g., Gächter, Herrmann, 
& Thöni, 2010; Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008), culture does have a great 
influence on the decision to trust others and to cooperate. It therefore remains an open 
question whether different cultures are equally influenced by both types of 
information when making judgments of trustworthiness. 
Thus, the present study investigated whether individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures differ in their use of two different sources of information—factual 
information and tacit cues—in building trust by having participants from Germany, a 
more individualistic culture, and the United Arab Emirates, a more collectivistic 
culture, play an online trust game in which they made buying decisions based on 
sellers' reputation (factual information) and sellers' avatars (tacit cues). 
Influence of Culture on Trust 
Cross-cultural research on trust has been largely based on the cultural 
dimensions introduced by Hofstede (e.g., Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). 
Especially the individualism/collectivism dimension has been used to explain and 
predict cross-cultural differences in trust and trust-related behavior. According to 
Hofstede (2010), members of collectivistic cultures define themselves over their 
membership in groups—the self and the group are strongly connected. On the other 
hand, members of individualistic cultures define themselves as separate, unique 
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individuals—the self can be part of a group but remains autonomous (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). 
In a large-scale cross-cultural study involving 31 different countries, 
Gheorghiu et al. (2009) could show that individualism/collectivism was strongly 
related to generalized social trust. Countries with strong collectivistic norms had 
lower levels of generalized social trust than countries with strong individualistic 
values. However, collectivists are not generally less trusting than individualists. As 
Huff and Kelley (2003) showed, the distinction between in- and out-group members is 
particularly important for collectivists and can explain lower levels of trust in 
collectivists. Even though both individualists and collectivists show a bias to trust the 
in-group, this bias is stronger in collectivists. Therefore, general lower levels of trust 
in collectivistic cultures can be explained by less trust to out-group members. 
Several studies have investigated how different sources of information affect 
trust building in individualistic and collectivistic cultures: With regard to the effect of 
reputation, Branzei et al. (2007) showed that both individualists and collectivists were 
negatively influenced in their decision to trust by a low reputation. In addition, they 
found that members of individualistic cultures were more influenced by dispositional 
factors of trustees whereas members of collectivistic cultures paid more attention to 
situational factors. In a different study, Vishwanath (2004) demonstrated that the 
generalized trust level in a culture influenced the effect of reputation on buying 
decisions. When the level of trust within a culture was high, a low reputation did not 
negatively affect decisions to buy. However, when the level of trust within a culture 
was low, a low reputation did lead to less trust.  
With regard to the effect of tacit, social cues, pictures had a strong influence 
on buying decisions in online auctions on buyers form a collectivistic culture as 
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compared to buyers from an individualistic culture (Vishwanath, 2003). In addition, 
trust based on personal relationships is more important in collectivistic cultures, 
whereas trust based on formal rules is more important in individualistic cultures 
(Bohnet, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2010). For instance, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 
(1994) found that members of collectivistic cultures rely more on social information 
and members of individualistic cultures more on reputation. Additionally, trust and 
cooperation are more strongly influenced on the basis of affect in collectivistic 
cultures, whereas individualistic cultures put more emphasis on cognitive elaboration 
(Dakhli, 2009). 
To summarize the results on cross-cultural differences in trust, members from 
collectivistic cultures are less likely to trust out-group members (Huff & Kelley, 
2003), put more emphasis on personal relationships (Bohnet et al., 2010), and pay 
more attention to situational factors (Branzei et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
members of individualistic cultures are more likely to trust out-group members (Huff 
& Kelley, 2003), prioritize formal rules over personal relationships (Bohnet et al., 
2010), and rely more on dispositional information (Branzei et al., 2007). Members 
from both cultures are negatively influenced in their decision to trust by a low 
reputation (Branzei et al., 2007; Vishwanath, 2004). Also, social, affective 
information does seem to have a stronger influence on members of collectivistic 
cultures (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Dakhli, 2009).  
Nevertheless, there is so far no study that has investigated the influence of 
both factual information and tacit, social cues on trust building in individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures. Based on the paradigm by Bente et al. (2012), the present study 
therefore investigated two different cultures—Germany and the United Arab 
Emirates—that have been described as distinct on the individualism/collectivism 
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dimension (Hofstede et al., 2010), with Germany being a more individualistic culture 
and the United Arab Emirates being a more collectivistic culture. 
In line with the results by Bente et al. (2012), it was expected that despite of 
cross-cultural differences both cultures would be generally influenced by the two 
types of information—reputation scores and seller avatars—in the trust game. Thus, 
the following general hypothesis is stated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Both reputation scores and seller avatars have a positive 
effect on purchase decisions. Positive reputation leads to more 
purchases than low reputation (H1a). Trustworthy seller avatars lead to 
more purchases than untrustworthy avatars (H1b). 
 
 Based on research showing that members of collectivistic cultures rely more 
on social information and members of individualistic cultures rely more on reputation 
(1994), it was hypothesized that both cultures differ in the weight they give to both 
sources of information: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relative influence of reputation scores and seller 
avatars on purchase decisions does differ between Germans and Arabs. 
Purchase decisions of Germans are more influenced by reputation 
scores (H2a). Purchase decisions of Arabs are more influenced by 
seller avatars (H2b). 
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In sum, the present study investigated whether German and Arab participants 
differ in their purchase decisions in an online trust game when presented with both 
reputation scores (factual information) and seller avatars (tacit, social cues). 
 
Methods 
Participants. Overall, 88 Arab and German participants were invited via 
email to take part in an online trust game in which they could earn between 6.30 and 9 
Dollar. Invitations were distributed through mailing lists of the University of Cologne 
(Germany) and the American University of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates). 
Four participants were excluded from this original sample for the following 
reasons: One participant did not report his/her own culture and could therefore not be 
categorized as Arab or German. Two German participants incorrectly selected the 
English version of the study and were therefore presented with the Arab avatars 
instead of the German Avatars. One German participant was excluded from the study 
because his/her purchasing behavior differed from all other participants. That 
participant never made a purchase in all 18 experimental trials, resulting in a z score 
of -3.59. 
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 42 German (9 male, 33 female; Mage = 
27.19, SDage = 8.95) and 42 Arab participants (9 male and 33 female; Mage = 27.19, 
SDage = 8.95). 
Design. The influence of culture, seller avatars, and reputation scores on 
purchase decisions was analyzed in a 2× 3 × 3 design, with culture (Arab vs. German) 
as a between-subjects factor and seller avatars (untrustworthy vs. trustworthy avatar) 
and reputation (high vs. low) as within-subjects factors 
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The main dependent variable was the number of purchases made in each 
condition. 
Stimulus materials. 
Trust game. Again, the standard trust game by Bolton (2004) provided the 
framework for the present study. In this trust game, a buyer (trustor) has to decide 
whether he will trust a seller (trustee) and buy a product from him/her. However, 
instead of actual products buyer and seller only exchange virtual units that are 
converted into real money at the end of the experiment. All possible decisions and 
outcomes of the trust game are shown in the pay-off matrix (see Figure 5). If the 
buyer decides not to buy (Case 1), both buyer and seller keep their 35 units. If the 
buyer decides to buy and the seller ships the product (Case 2a), both buyer and seller 
receive 50 units for the successful trade. If the buyer decides to buy and the seller 
does not ship the product (Case 2b), the buyer loses his/her 35 units to the seller, who 
receives 70 units. 
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Figure 5. Pay-off matrix for the trust game showing all possible decisions and 
outcomes. 
Seller avatars. A prestudy with Arab and German participants was conducted 
to select appropriate avatars for the study. To avoid the influence of stereotypes on 
decision making, participants in the final trust game were presented only with avatars 
from their own culture. German participants saw only German avatars, and Arab 
participants saw only Arab avatars. Therefore, the goal was to select two separate sets 
of trustworthy and untrustworthy avatars for each culture.  
18 male German and 18 male Arab avatars matched for attractiveness and 
cultural typicality were selected from a database of Arab and German avatars (Bente 
et al., in preparation). German avatars were created with the software FaceGen 
(Singular Inversions, 2011), using portrait photographs of students at the University 
of Cologne. All participants in the database gave written consent for the use of their 
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photos. Arab avatars were created on the basis of the German avatars using the 
software's ethnicity transformation tool. Facial expression and gaze of all avatars was 
standardized.  
 Attractiveness ratings for all avatars in the database had been collected in a 
prestudy with 42 participants from Germany (4 male, 38 female; Mage = 23.4, SDage = 
4.4) and 31 students from the United Arab Emirates (7 male, 24 female; Mage = 26.4, 
SDage = 7.9). Ratings for the cultural typicality and the gender of the avatars had been 
collected in another prestudy with 32 participants from Germany (4 male, 28 female; 
Mage = 23.7, SDage = 3.9) and 19 participants from the United Arab Emirates (9 male, 
10 female; Mage = 24.1, SDage =5.7). Because several studies have shown that ratings 
of attractiveness and trustworthiness are strongly linked (Theodoridou, Rowe, Penton-
Voak, & Rogers, 2009), attractiveness ratings from the prestudy were used as a proxy 
for trustworthiness. Therefore, avatars with medium high and low attractiveness 
ratings were selected.  
To ensure that avatars would be clearly identified as Arab or German, only 
avatars with cultural typicality ratings higher than 80% were selected. In addition, 
only avatars that were unambiguously judged to be male were chosen. Thus, 18 male 
German and 18 male Arab avatars matched for attractiveness and cultural typicality 
were selected. To acquire ratings of trustworthiness for these 36 avatars, they were 
presented to 54 participants in another prestudy with 18 Arab (9 male, 9 female; Mage 
= 20.0, SDage = 1.4) and 36 German participants (10 male, 26 female; Mage = 36.7, 
SDage = 11.3) who rated the trustworthiness of the avatars on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (very untrustworthy) to 7 (very trustworthy). Both German and Arab 
participants showed strong intercultural agreement with regard to the trustworthiness 
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ratings of the avatars, indicated by a strong positive correlations between the 
trustworthiness from the two cultures, r(40) = .73, p < .01. 
Avatars were ranked according to their trustworthiness ratings. The six avatars 
with the highest trustworthiness ratings in each culture were selected as the 
trustworthy avatars; the six avatars with the lowest trustworthiness ratings in each 
culture were selected as the untrustworthy avatars (see Figure 6 for two avatars from 
each culture).  
 
Figure 6. Trustworthy and untrustworthy avatars from both cultures (German and 
Arab). 
In both cultures, trustworthy avatars received significantly higher 
trustworthiness ratings than untrustworthy avatars: Trustworthy Arab avatars (M = 
4.32, SD = 1.03) received significantly higher trustworthiness ratings from Arab 
participants than untrustworthy Arab avatars, (M = 3.07, SD = 0.96), t(17)= 5.14, p < 
.001, d = 1.23. Trustworthy German (M = 3.96, SD = 0.90) avatars received 
significantly higher trustworthiness ratings from German participants than 
untrustworthy German avatars (M = 3.15, SD = 0.89), t(35)= 7.83, p < .001, d = 0.91. 
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The remaining six avatars from each culture were used as filler trails in the final 
experiment. 
Reputation scores. The reputation of the sellers was symbolized using a 
reputation index with five stars—with the number of stars representing the percentage 
of previous trades in which the seller had shipped the product after receiving the 
payment (one star: 0–20%; two stars: 21–40%; three stars: 41–60%; four stars: 61–
80%; five stars: 81–100%). Appropriate reputation scores were selected based on the 
prestudy by Bente et al. (2012): 30 participants (16 male, 14 female) rated the 
trustworthiness of the different levels of the reputation score on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very untrustworthy) to 7 (very trustworthy). Based on the results of 
the prestudy, two of the star-indexes were selected for the study: Three stars (the 
seller shipped the product 41–60% of the time) led to a significantly lower trust rating 
(M = 2.90, SD = 1.30) than four stars (the seller shipped the product 61–80% the 
time), t(29) = 8.95, p < .001, d = 1.7. 
Procedure. All participants completed the study online using their own 
computers. At the beginning of the study, participants were informed that they would 
now play an online trust game with buyers and sellers, and that their own role in the 
trust game would be determined randomly. On the next page, participants were 
informed that they had been randomly assigned the role of the buyer—all participants 
were assigned the role of the buyer—and that they would now play the trust game 
with several other players who had been assigned the role of the seller. Participants 
were then informed that the sellers would be represented through virtual avatars 
generated out of real photographs. One photograph and one avatar were provided as 
an example. To avoid the influence of stereotypes on decision making, participants in 
the final trust game were presented only with avatars from their own culture. German 
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participants saw only German avatars, and Arab participants saw only Arab avatars. 
After participants had been informed about the avatars, participants were introduced 
to the five-star reputation score. Participants were then informed that they would not 
receive immediate feedback on the decisions of the sellers, but that their final 
earnings would be calculated based on the decisions of the sellers. After that, 
participants proceeded to the actual profiles of the sellers that included the sellers' 
avatar and reputation, and decided for each profile whether they would buy from that 
particular seller (see Figure 7 for a sample profile). 
 
Figure 7. Screenshot of the profile of one seller in the trust game, showing a 
trustworthy Arab avatar with a low reputation score (three stars). 
Participants then completed 12 experimental trials and 6 filler trials (two filler 
trials in the beginning, four filler trials randomly mixed with the experimental trials). 
Filler trials always used reputation scores other than three or four stars and were 
included to distract participants from the repeated presentation of reputation scores 
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three and four. After participants had completed all trials, they were thanked for their 
participation and informed that they would receive a voucher for Amazon worth their 
payment. Payment was calculated based on participants' decisions in the trust game. If 
participants had decided to buy the product, payment was always calculated as if the 
seller had shipped the product. Final payment to participants ranged from 6.30 to 8.55 
Dollar (M = 7.78, SD = 0.41). 
Dependent variable. The number of purchases in each condition was used as 
the dependent variable. 
Results 
Because there was an unequal distribution of male and female participants in 
both cultures, χ2(1, N = 84) = 15.75, p < .001, it was first checked whether 
participant's gender had any influence on the results. A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 (gender × culture 
× reputation × seller avatars) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for 
gender, F(1, 80) = .31, p = .58, η2p = .004, nor any significant interaction effects, F < 
2.9. Therefore, gender was dropped as a factor from all further analyses. 
Buying decisions were analyzed in a 2 × 2 × 2 (culture × reputation × seller 
depictions) mixed ANOVA. There was a significant main effect for reputation, F(1, 
82) = 56.37 p < .001, η2p = .41, indicating that a high reputation (M = 2.40, SD = 
0.71) caused participants to buy significantly more often than a low reputation (M = 
1.40, SD =.99). Thus, Hypothesis H1a, stating that reputation has a positive influence 
on buying decisions, was supported. 
There was also a significant main effect for seller avatars, F(1, 82) = 17.74, p 
< .001, η2p = .18, indicating that a trustworthy avatar (M = 2.08, SD = 0.65) caused 
participants to buy significantly more often than an untrustworthy avatar (M = 1.71, 
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SD = 0.81). Therefore, Hypothesis H1b, stating that seller avatars have a positive 
influence on buying decisions, was also supported. 
There was no significant main effect for culture, F(1, 82) = 1.56, p = .215, η2p 
= .019, indicating that neither of the cultures bought generally more in the trust game 
than the other. There was also no significant three-way interaction between 
reputation, seller avatars, and culture, F(1, 82) = 0.34, p = .854, η2p < .001. 
Thus, Hypothesis H2 in general, stating that reputation and seller avatars 
would have different effects in the two cultures, with Germans being more influenced 
by reputation and Arabs being more influenced by seller avatars, was not supported. 
 There was no significant two-way interaction between culture and avatar, F(1, 
82) = .30, p = . 59, η2p = .004. Thus, hypothesis H2a could not be supported. There 
was no significant interaction between avatar and reputation, F(1, 82) < .01, p = 1.00, 
η2p < .001. 
However, There was significant two-way interaction between reputation and 
culture, F(1, 82) = 4.23, p = .043, η2p = .049, showing that German and Arab 
participants responded differently to sellers with high and low reputation (see Figure 
8). Thus, hypothesis H2b could be partially supported. 
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Figure 8. Two-way interaction between reputation and culture. * p < .05. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that German participants (M = 1.18, SD = 1.13) 
bought significantly less often when the reputation was low than Arab participants (M 
= 1.62, SD = 0.84), t(82) = -2.03, p = .045, d = -0.44. There was no difference in the 
number of purchases between German (M = 2.45, SD = 0.79) and Arab participants 
(M = 2.35, SD = 0.63) when the reputation of the seller was high, t(82) = 0.69, p = 
.493, d = 0.14.  
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures differ in their use of two different sources of information—factual 
information and tacit cues—in building trust. As the results of the trust game show, 
participants from Germany, a more individualistic culture, and the United Arab 
Emirates, a more collectivistic culture, were influenced by both reputation scores and 
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seller avatars. These results are in line with previous studies that have found a positive 
effect of reputation and seller photographs on buying decisions (e.g., Bente et al., 
2012; Branzei et al., 2007; Vishwanath, 2004). The results of the present study extend 
the findings of Bente et al. (2012)—found in Western participants—to members of a 
collectivistic culture: the United Arab Emirates. 
In contrast to previous studies that have found that members of collectivistic 
cultures show lower levels of trust than members of individualistic cultures (2009), 
the present study did not find a general effect of culture on the willingness to trust. In 
the trust game, Arab participants were not less likely to trust potential sellers than 
German participants. As Huff and Kelley (2003) could show, the distinction between 
in- and out-group members may be particularly important for members of 
collectivistic cultures. Therefore, in the present study, the culture of the seller avatars 
and of the participants had been matched—Arab participants saw only Arab avatars, 
and German participants saw only German avatars. The results show that this 
matching was successful in preventing a potential in-group bias in the Arab 
participants from distorting the results. However, a future study should present sellers 
from both cultures to Arab and German participants to test if the reported in-group 
bias in collectivists can be replicated (Huff & Kelley, 2003). 
Based on previous cross-cultural research on the influence of social 
information as opposed to reputation (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), it was 
hypothesized that Arab and German participants would differ in their susceptibility to 
reputation scores and seller avatars. However, this hypothesis was only partially 
supported by the results. As for the effect of seller avatars, the present study did not 
find a stronger influence of seller avatars on members of a collectivistic culture. 
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Nevertheless, both cultures did differ in the effect of reputation on purchase 
decisions. German participants bought significantly less often than Arab participants 
when the reputation of the seller was low. This result is in line with previous studies 
that have shown that members of individualistic cultures rely more on formal criteria 
and factual information (Bohnet et al., 2010; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In the 
present study, reputation was operationalized as the percentage of previous trades in 
which the seller had successfully shipped the product. The reputation could therefore 
be conceived of as a disposition of the seller to ship the product. As a previous study 
by Branzei et al. (2007) has shown, members of individualistic cultures are more 
influenced by dispositional factors of trustees whereas members of collectivistic 
cultures pay more attention to situational factors. More generally, it has been shown 
that members of collectivistic cultures rely more on situational factors when 
predicting behavior whereas members of individualistic cultures rely more on 
dispositional factors (Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996). It is therefore possible that 
German participants conceived of the reputation of the seller as a disposition 
predictive of his/her behavior in the current transaction. Arab participants, on the 
other hand, may have considered other situational factors competing with the 
predictive value of the reputation. Thus, future studies should investigate why 
particularly negative information may have a strong predictive value for individualists 
as opposed to collectivists. 
Another explanation might involve both cultures' generalized level of trust. As 
Vishwanath (2004) has shown, the generalized trust level in a culture influences the 
effect of reputation on buying decisions. When the level of trust within a culture is 
high, a low reputation does not negatively affect buying decisions. However, when 
the level of trust within a culture is low, a low reputation does lead to less trust. 
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Germany was among the cultures investigated by Vishwanath (2004), displaying 
medium levels of generalized trust, and, consequently, German participants were 
moderately affected by a low reputation in their buying decisions. It is therefore 
possible that the difference in purchase decisions under low reputation in the present 
study can be explained by different levels of generalized trust between the German 
and Arab participants. However, generalized trust in Arab countries tends to be low 
(Jamal, 2007), casting at least some doubt on this explanation. Nevertheless, future 
cross-cultural studies on the influence of reputation on buying decisions should 
measure participants' generalized trust level as a possible covariate. 
With regard to the use of virtual avatars as stimuli in the present study, the 
results of the present study are similar to the outcome of Study I. Again, the effect 
sizes for virtual avatars were smaller (η2p = .18) than for reputation (η2p = .41). Taking 
into account the equal effect sizes for photographs and reputation found by Bente et 
al. (2012), the results further support the notion that virtual avatars produce slightly 
weaker responses than actual photographs. Nevertheless, virtual avatars were used by 
members of both cultures as a source of information that influenced behavioral trust, 
hinting at the possibility that the tendency to trust avatars may not be limited to 
Western cultures. 
Taken together, the present study shows that members of individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures both rely on factual information and tacit, social cues in 
building trust. However, negative reputation seems to have a special salience for 
members of individualistic cultures, translating into a decrease in behavioral trust and 
a drop in purchases. 
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Study 3: Direct Gaze Detection in High-functioning Autism 
Introduction 
The perception of direct gaze—i.e., being gazed at directly by another 
person—is crucial to human social interaction: It can signal the attention of others and 
mediate the perception of displayed emotions (Adams & Kleck, 2005). In addition, it 
provides the basis for mutual gaze, the shared gaze between two persons. The ability 
to detect direct gaze is a fundamental function established early in our evolution 
(Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka, & Matsuzawa, 2003) and can be measured 
as early as in 2- to 5-day-old infants, who are able to distinguish between faces with 
direct and averted gaze, and who prefer to look at faces with direct gaze (Farroni, 
Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002).  
Recent studies have focused on the question of how accurate individuals with 
autism are at detecting direct gaze (see Nation & Penny, 2008; Senju & Johnson, 
2009). Even though there are several studies that hint at deficits (Gepner, de Gelder, 
& de Schonen, 1996; Howard et al. 2000; Swettenham et al., 2001; Senju, Yaguchi, 
Tojo, & Hasegawa, 2003; Wallace, Coleman, Pascalis, & Bailey, 2006), there are also 
studies that show no deficits (Senju, Hasegawa, & Tojo, 2005; Senju, Kikuchi, 
Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 2008; Webster & Potter, 2011). In addition, the 
developmental trajectory of the putative impairment is unclear. Because accumulating 
neuropsychological evidence hints at a general difference between individuals with 
autism and neurotypical individuals in the way they process direct gaze (Grice et al., 
2005; Kylliäinen & Hietanen, 2006; Joseph, Ehrman, McNally, & Keehn, 2008; 
Elsabbagh et al., 2009; Akechi et al., 2010; Pitskel et al., 2011), it might be possible 
that the ability to detect direct gaze is impaired even in adults with autism. 
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Only two studies so far have investigated the ability to detect direct gaze in 
adults with autism: Howard et al. (2000) found differences between individuals with 
autism and neurotypical individuals on a task in which participants had to select one 
image displaying direct gaze out of two. However, using the same paradigm, Webster 
and Potter (2011) were not able to replicate this finding. The fact that this impairment 
has not been consistently observed can in part be explained by several shortcomings 
of previous studies. 
First, all studies so far have used tasks that do not measure the critical ability 
in question—namely, being able to differentiate between direct gaze and averted gaze. 
All studies did use either a comparison task (Gepner et al., 1996; Howard et al., 2000; 
Swettenham et al., 2001; Webster & Potter, 2011) or a visual search task (Senju et al., 
2003; Senju et al., 2005; Senju et al., 2008). In the comparison task, participants had 
to select out of pairs of images the one displaying direct gaze. In the visual search 
task, participants had to find one face displaying direct gaze that was presented along 
with several faces showing averted gaze. Whereas these tasks might be useful to find 
crude differences in accuracy to detect direct gaze, different task settings modeling 
natural situations that require detection of direct gaze might provide a better 
framework to detect subtle impairments (Wilms et al., 2010). 
Second, all studies used large variations of gaze direction. The visual search 
task described above included only two variations—direct gaze or averted gaze. Even 
though the degrees of deviation were not reported in the studies (e.g., Senju et al., 
2003), compared to the stimuli used in the current experiment it is safe to conclude 
that the gaze was at least averted by 15°. In the comparison task (e.g., Webster & 
Potter, 2011), gaze was averted by either 20°, 15°, 10°, or 5°. Psychophysical studies 
investigating the accuracy to detect deviations from direct gaze, however, have found 
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that humans are able to distinguish degrees between direct and averted gaze that are 
far more subtle (Gamer & Hecht, 2007). Thus, previous studies did not use stimuli in 
a range (between 0°–10°) that provides a sufficient level of ambiguity to detect group 
differences. 
All these factors might explain why previous studies of direct gaze detection 
in autism have failed to find clear differences between individuals with autism and 
typically developing individuals. Thus, these shortcomings were addressed in the 
present study by using a realistic virtual character showing realistic gaze behavior that 
varied in small increments between direct and averted gaze. 
Additionally, it seems important to consider what other factors of gaze 
behavior might contribute to a deficit in detecting direct gaze in autism. One 
important aspect of gaze behavior that previous studies have ignored is the social 
nature of gaze (Wilms et al., 2010). In naturalistic situations, gaze is embedded in a 
social context, signaling communicative meaning and creating affordances to act 
(Schilbach, Eickhoff, Cieslik, Kuzmanovic, & Vogeley, 2011). Most importantly, 
gaze is often ambiguous and unpredictable. It might be this unpredictability that could 
interfere with the ability to detect direct gaze in individuals with autism. Several 
theories have identified the predictability of social situations as an important factor 
influencing the behavior of individuals with autism (Gomot & Wicker, 2011; Qian & 
Lipkin, 2011; Baron-Cohen, 2009; Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 
1998). For instance, Baron-Cohen et al. (2009) proposed that autism is characterized 
by a strong drive to predict and control the environment. Consequently, it has been 
shown that children with autism favor predictable over unpredictable environments 
(Ferrara & Hill, 1980) and exhibit more problematic behaviors, such as self-hits and 
aggression, in unpredictable environments (Flannery & Horner, 1994). If the 
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unpredictability of a situation is removed by imitating children with autism, 
communicative gaze increases (Sanefuji & Ohgami, 2011). This preference for 
predictable over unpredictable stimuli seems to extend to simple displays of motion. 
When presented with point-light-displays of either biological motion or non-social 
contingencies, two-year-olds with autism spend more time looking at non-social 
contingencies (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, Ramsay, & Jones, 2009). Besides preferring 
predictable stimuli, children with autism seem to be impaired in their ability to predict 
the variability of common real-life events (Loth, Happé, & Gómez, 2010).  
One of the key features of social gaze is its independence and goal-
directedness that can only be partly predicted by relying on general knowledge about 
social situations or taking the perspective of another person. Inanimate objects and 
non-social systems, on the other hand, can be understood and predicted in a 
mechanistic way by observing and controlling the relations between the input and 
output of the system.  
Social gaze, therefore, poses a double burden to individuals with autism: First, 
because of a general deficit in social interaction, individuals with autism are impaired 
in their ability to understand and interpret the gaze of another person and are therefore 
not able to predict it. Second, because the gaze of another person usually cannot be 
controlled, individuals with autism are not able to explore the underlying rules of the 
gaze behavior to make it more predictable in the future. In other words, individuals 
with autism might be impaired in the processing of social gaze because it appears 
unpredictable to them. A possible explanation for the development of this impairment 
has been provided by the social orienting hypothesis (Dawson et al., 1998), according 
to which children with autism are less drawn to social stimuli because they seem 
unpredictable to them. Because they spend less time attending to social stimuli than 
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typically developing children, they miss the opportunity to learn about social stimuli, 
which would make them more predictable to them. Thus, a negative feedback loop 
develops—unpredictable social stimuli cause children with autism to spend less time 
attending to them, which makes social stimuli even more unpredictable and causes 
children with autism to spend even less time attending to them. One way to break this 
feedback loop would be to create predictable social environments that can be 
controlled by individuals with autism to help them overcome their deficits. 
Based on these assumptions, the following prediction can be made: If given 
the opportunity to control the gaze of another person and thus increase the 
predictability of the situation, individuals with autism should be able to overcome 
their deficit. Because the gaze of another person usually cannot be controlled in real-
life situations, individuals with autism have no opportunity to experience social gaze 
in a predictable environment. However, computer-generated stimuli allow to create 
social gaze stimuli that are ecologically valid and yet can be well controlled (Wilms et 
al., 2010). This approach was used in the present study to investigate the relation 
between the controllability of social stimuli and the detection of direct gaze by 
individuals with autism. 
In sum, the aim of the present study was twofold: First, using a realistic virtual 
character displaying dynamic gaze behavior with fine-tuned variations, it was 
investigated whether individuals diagnosed with autism are impaired in their ability to 
detect direct gaze. Second, by giving participants control over the gaze of a social 
character, the effect of having control over a social stimulus on gaze detection 
abilities was examined. 
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Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. Nineteen adults with high-functioning autism (10 male, 9 
female; Mage = 39.1, age range: 23–53 years) were recruited at the Adult Autism 
Outpatient Clinic of the Department of Psychiatry at the University Hospital of a large 
city in Western Germany. All participants with high-functioning autism were 
diagnosed by two independent physicians according to ICD-10 criteria. In line with 
other studies (e.g., Frith & de Vignemont, 2005), high-functioning autism is used as 
an umbrella term for both high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome. Nineteen 
control participants (11 male, 8 female; Mage = 33.8, age range: 20–48 years) were 
recruited at the Department of Psychology at the University of a large city in Western 
Germany. Both groups were matched for age, gender, years of formal education, and 
intelligence (measured with the German version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-Revised (WAIS-R; Tewes, 1994). Participants also completed the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, 1995), the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & Wheelwright, 
2006), and the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test" (ToM-Eyes; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
On average, there was no difference in age between participants diagnosed 
with autism (M = 39.1, SD = 9.4) and participants in the control group (M = 33.8, SD 
= 7.3), t(36) = 1.95, p = .060, d = 0.63. See Table 3 for an overview of demographic 
and psychopathological variables for both groups. 
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Table 3 
Demographic, Psychopathological, and IQ Results for the Pilot Study 
  HFA  
(n = 19) 
 Control 
(n = 19) 
      
Variable  M SD  M SD  t(36)  p  Cohen's d 
Age (years)  39.1 9.4  33.8 7.3  1.95  .060  0.63 
Education (years)  18.3 3.0  20.1 4.5  -1.42  .163  -0.47 
WAIS-R verbal IQ  124.9 11.5  126.6 7.4  -0.52  .605  -0.18 
WAIS-R performance IQ  123.3 13.8  127.7 11.4  -1.08  .288  -0.35 
WAIS-R IQ (total)  127.0 12.3  132.2 8.1  -1.53  .135  -0.50 
BDI  11.3 7.1  4.9 3.1  3.60  .001  1.17 
AQ  41.1 3.8  14.2 5.5  17.66  <.001  5.69 
ToM-Eyes  16.2 4.2  18.6 3.1  -2.03  .050  -0.65 
 
Note. WAIS-R = Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults, BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory, AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient, ToM-Eyes = Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test 
 
There was also no difference between the HFA group (M = 18.3, SD = 3.0) 
and the control group (M = 20.1, SD = 4.5) with regard to years of formal education, 
t(36) = -1.42, p = .163, d = -0.47. Furthermore, there was no difference in intelligence 
between participants diagnosed with autism (M = 127.0, SD = 12.3) and participants 
in the control group (M = 132.2, SD = 8.1), t(36) = -1.53, p = .135, d = -0.50. 
Participants diagnosed with autism had higher scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, 1995) (M = 11.3, SD = 7.1) than 
participants in the control group (M = 4.9, SD = 3.1), t(36) = 3.60, p = .001, d = 1.17. 
This was to be expected because high-functioning autism is known to have a higher 
prevalence of depression (Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, Hasan, & O'Brien, 2006; 
Lehnhardt et al., 2011). Confirming clinical diagnosis, participants diagnosed with 
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autism scored higher on the Autism Spectrum Quotient (M = 41.1, SD = 3.8) than 
participants in the control group (M = 14.2, SD = 5.5), t(36) = 17.66, p < .001, d = 
5.69. In addition, there was a marginally significant difference on the ToM-Eyes test 
between the HFA group (M = 16.2, SD = 4.2) and the control group (M = 18.6, SD = 
3.1), t(36) = -2.03, p = .050, d = -0.65. 
Stimulus materials. In the detection task, participants’ accuracy to detect 
when a realistic virtual character was gazing directly at them was tested.  
As the stimulus in the detection task, the present study used a realistic virtual 
character created in the commercially available software Poser 6 (see Figure 9a). 
 
Figure 9. (a) Realistic virtual character, (b) reduced virtual character, and (c) non-
social, geometric stimulus. 
Because the criterion for judging gaze as direct can be biased by a smiling 
expression, with smiles increasing the chance of perceiving gaze as direct (Martin & 
Rovira, 1982), the virtual character showed a neutral expression. The virtual character 
was moving its eyes and fixated different positions. Fixations included direct gaze, 
slightly averted gaze, and clearly averted gaze. To describe the position of the eyes, a 
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system with two rotations (y and z) was used. Y-rotation described the degree of 
deviation from the center of the eyes (see Figure 10a); z-rotation described the 
direction of the deviation from the center of the eyes (see Figure 10b). 
 
Figure 10. Gaze positions at different degrees of (a) y-rotation and (b) z-rotation. 
To determine which degrees of y-rotation would be perceived as direct gaze, a 
pilot study was conducted. 20 participants (13 female, 7 male) saw pictures of the 
virtual character with the gaze angle varying on the y-axis from 1° to 10°. For every 
picture, the participants rated whether they felt that the virtual character's gaze was 
direct. Rotations of 1° and 2° were mistaken for direct gaze by 80% of the participants 
(3°: 70%, 4°: 60%, 5°: 35%, 6°: 10%). All participants correctly identified deviations 
of 7° and more as averted gaze. As a result, gaze angles ranging from 0° to 7° on the 
y-axis were used in the experiment, because they provided a sufficient level of 
ambiguity. Because the y-axis only determined the amount of deviation from the 
center of the eye, different degrees on the z-axis were used to vary the direction of the 
virtual character’s gaze. Combining both y- and z-angles a realistic gaze sequence 
with 10 hits and 20 distractors was created. The order in which the different y-angles 
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appeared in the gaze sequence was completely randomized and a set of 30 trials was 
programmed. At the beginning of each trial, the virtual character showed clearly 
averted gaze (15 – 25° on the y-axis) for 2,000 ms. After that, it moved its eyes to a 
fixation point of either 0° (hit) or 1-7° (false alarm). The duration of the fixation was 
randomly chosen to be either 2,000 ms or 4,000 ms based on earlier studies on social 
gaze (Bente, Donaghy, & Suwelack, 1998; Bente, Eschenburg, & Krämer, 2007; 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2009) that have shown that a gaze duration of around 4,000 ms is 
perceived as pleasant. Therefore, each trial lasted either 4,000 ms or 6,000 ms. 
Participants used a mouse to signal when the virtual character was showing direct 
gaze, clicking the left mouse button each time they felt the virtual character was 
gazing directly at them. Dependent variables were reaction times, the number of 
correct responses (hits), and the number of false alarms. Because previous studies 
have shown that social stimuli, such as faces, are less pleasant for individuals with 
autism (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Hutt & Ounsted, 1966; Richer & Coss, 
1976), participants were asked to rate the pleasantness (1 = very unpleasant to 5 = 
very pleasant) of the task on a 5-point scale. If gaze detection is impaired in 
individuals with autism, a task demanding participants to detect direct gaze might be 
perceived as difficult. Therefore, participants were also asked to rate the difficulty (1 
= very easy to 5 = very difficult) of the task on a 5-point scale. 
In the setting task, participants’ accuracy to actively establish direct gaze with 
a virtual character was assessed. As the virtual character, a reduced avatar was used 
(see Figure 9b) that had been employed in previous experiments of this research 
group (Bente et al., 2007). Instead of detecting when the virtual character was gazing 
at them, participants actively established direct gaze using the mouse. In each trial, 
the eyes of the virtual character appeared in a random position of averted gaze. In 
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addition, the rotation of the virtual character´s head was also varied between 0° and 
30° on the horizontal, vertical, and sagittal axis. Participants used the mouse to move 
the eyes of the virtual character into a position that matched direct gaze as closely as 
possible. When the participants had established that position, they pressed a button on 
the mouse and the eyes of the virtual character moved to a new random position. 
Participants completed a sequence of 16 trials. There was no time limit for each trial 
to allow the participants to work as accurately as possible. Dependent variables were 
reaction times and degrees of deviation from a perfect eye contact. 
Procedure. All participants were tested at the Department of Psychiatry at the 
University Hospital of a large city in Western Germany. Prior to the experiment, all 
participants gave consent to participate. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity. The experimental stimuli were presented on a 17-in. monitor 
with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. Each participant completed both the setting 
and detection task in one single session. To eliminate carry-over-effects, all tasks 
were presented in random order. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter 
greeted the participants and told them that they were going to take part in an 
experiment on social perception. After that, they sat down in a chair approximately 50 
cm from the computer. They positioned their head so that the eyes were looking at the 
centre of the screen, and the experimenter started the experiment. The participants 
then saw a grey screen with white instructions explaining the first of the two tasks. 
Participants could read the instructions at their own pace and then proceeded to the 
actual task. After they had completed the first task, participants proceeded to the 
instructions for the second task. Participants rated the pleasantness and the difficulty 
of the detection task on a paper questionnaire next to the computer. The experiment 
ended, after participants had completed all tasks. After the experiment, participants 
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completed the BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, 1995), the AQ (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2006), the WAIS-R (Tewes, 1994), and the ToM-Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). 
Results and Discussion 
Detection task. Accurate gaze detection includes both correctly detecting 
direct gaze and classifying gaze as averted that is not direct. A person classifying 
every gaze direction in the experiment as direct would correctly detect all instances of 
direct gaze, but the high rate of false alarms would indicate that this person is not 
truly able to distinguish between direct and averted gaze. To compare both groups' 
ability to detect direct gaze, a sensitivity index d' was calculated out of the number of 
correct responses and the number of false alarms. There was a significant difference 
in d' between the HFA group (M = 0.18, SD = 0.51) and the control group (M = 1.00, 
SD = 0.45), t(36) = -5.19, p < .001, d = -1.71 (see Figure 11a). 
 
Figure 11. Overall results of the pilot study: (a) detection task and (b) setting task. 
Error bars represent 95%-CI of the mean. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
To analyze at which degrees of deviation both groups differed, the percentage 
of false alarms at each angle, ranging from 1°–7°, was compared in a 2 × 7 mixed 
ANOVA (group × angle). As expected, there was a significant effect of group on 
percent of false alarms, F(1, 36) = 36.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .506. There was also a 
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significant effect of angle, F(6, 216) = 6.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .151. There was no 
significant interaction effect between group and angle, F(6, 216) = 0.26, p = .957, ηp2 
= .007. Independent sample t tests using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha (α = .05/7 = 
.007) were used to compare both group's performance for the different degrees (1°–
7°). As shown in Table 4 and Figure 12, participants in the HFA group produced 
significantly more false alarms than control participants at 3°, 4°, 5°, and 6°. 
Table 4 
Percent of False Alarms at Different Angles (1°–7°) 
  HFA 
(n = 19) 
 Control 
(n = 19) 
      
Angle  M SD  M SD  t(36)  p  Cohen's d 
1°  100.00 0.00  78.95 41.89 
 2.19  .042  0.71 
2°  100.00 0.00  68.42 47.76 
 2.88  .010  0.94 
3°  92.11 18.73  63.16 36.67 
 3.06  .005  0.99 
4°  83.16 17.97  58.95 22.58 
 3.66  .001  1.19 
5°  86.32 21.14  63.16 23.35 
 3.21  .003  1.04 
6°  72.37 35.25  38.16 33.71 
 3.06  .004  0.99 
7°  76.32 34.83  47.37 42.41 
 2.30  .028  0.75 
 
Note. Using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha (α = .05/7 = .007), only p values below .007 
are considered to be significant. 
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Figure 12. Percent of false alarms at different angles (1°–7°). Error bars represent 
95%-CI of the mean. 
With regard to reaction times, there was no significant difference between the 
HFA group (M = 1,180 ms, SD = 669 ms) and the control group (M = 1,340 ms, SD = 
421 ms), t(36) = -0.99, p = .329, d = -0.32. 
Perceived pleasantness of the task did differ significantly between the HFA 
group (M = 2.56, SD = 0.92) and the control group (M = 3.47, SD = 0.90), t(35) = -
3.06, p = .004, d = -1.00. This indicates that participants in the control group 
perceived the task with the virtual character to be more pleasant than participants in 
the HFA group. 
In addition, participants in the HFA group (M = 2.89, SD = 1.08) did perceive 
the task to be more difficult than participants in the control group (M = 1.79, SD = 
0.85), t(35) = 3.45, p = .001, d = 1.13. 
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Setting task. There was no significant difference between the HFA group (M 
= 5.89, SD = 1.87) and the control group (M = 5.99, SD = 2.19) in the accuracy to 
establish direct gaze, t(36) = -0.16, p = .876, d = -0.05 (see Figure 11b). 
However, there was a significant difference with regard to reaction times 
between the HFA group (M = 4,501 ms, SD = 1,703 ms) and the control group (M = 
3,542 ms, SD = 1,148 ms), t(36) = 2.04, p = .049, d = 0.66, indicating that participants 
in the HFA group did take longer to complete the setting task. 
Taken together, the results of the pilot study provide evidence that adults 
diagnosed with autism are impaired in the detection of direct gaze indexed by 
difficulties to distinguish subtle degrees of difference between averted and direct 
gaze. Especially gaze that is averted by 3°, 4°, 5°, and 6° was routinely mistaken to be 
direct by the participants in the autism group. However, there seems to be a threshold 
at around 7° at which both groups agree that gaze is averted. In line with theories 
about the aversiveness of social gaze for individuals with autism (e.g., Corden et al., 
2008, participants in the autism group did perceive the detection task to be less 
pleasant and more difficult than the control group. As for the setting task, participants 
with autism were as accurate as participants in the control group at establishing direct 
gaze with the virtual character, indicating that the control over a stimulus might be an 
important mediating factor in the detection of direct gaze. 
Experiment 2 
Even though the pilot study did provide support for the hypotheses, it suffered 
from several limitations. First, there was no non-social control stimulus in either the 
detection or setting task to which the performance of both groups could have been 
compared. Thus, it is possible that the lower performance of the HFA group in the 
detection task is not limited to the social domain and does rather reflect a general 
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processing deficit. To address this issue, a non-social control task was added to the 
design of the present study to assess the participant's performance in a non-social 
setting. 
Second, whereas the detection task did use a realistic virtual character, the 
setting task did only use a reduced virtual character that consisted of the eye-region 
including the nose. Therefore, the fact that the present study did not find any 
difference in the performance on this task between the HFA group and the control 
group might be due to the reduced appearance of the virtual character. To exclude this 
alternative explanation, in the main experiment the same realistic virtual character 
was used for both the detection and the setting task. 
Third, in the pilot study pleasantness and difficulty was only assessed for the 
detection task. In order to investigate whether control over the stimulus does affect 
the subjective experience of the task, pleasantness and difficulty were also measured 
for the setting task in the main experiment. 
Methods 
Participants. Thirty-seven adults with high-functioning autism (23 male, 14 
female; Mage = 34.1, age range: 18–51 years) were recruited at the Adult Autism 
Outpatient Clinic of the Department of Psychiatry at the University Hospital of a large 
city in Western Germany. All participants with high-functioning autism were 
diagnosed by two independent physicians according to ICD-10 criteria. Thirty-nine 
control participants (23 male, 16 female; Mage = 31.1, age range: 24–45 years) were 
recruited at the Department of Psychology at the University of a large city in Western 
Germany. Both groups were matched for age, gender, and intelligence (measured with 
the German version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WIE – Wechsler 
Intelligenztest für Erwachsene; Von Aster, Neubauer, & Horn, 2006). Participants 
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also completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987; 
Hautzinger, 1995), the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2006), the 
Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), and the Systemizing 
Quotient (Wheelwright et al., 2006). 
On average, there was no difference in age between participants diagnosed with 
autism (M = 34.1, SD = 10.1) and participants in the control group (M = 31.1, SD = 
4.3), t(74) = 1.71, p = .092, d = 0.39. See Table 5 for an overview of demographic and 
psychopathological variables for both groups. 
Table 5 
Demographic, Psychopathological, and IQ results for the Main Experiment 
  HFA 
(n = 37) 
 Control 
(n = 39) 
        
Variable  M SD  M SD  df  t  p  Cohen's d 
Age (years)  34.1 10.1  31.1 4.3  74  1.71  .092  0.39 
WIE verbal IQa  112.4 17.0  113.8 12.9  72  -0.42  .679  -0.09 
WIE performance IQa  103.5 20.4  107.2 13.2  72  -0.93  .357  -0.22 
WIE IQ (total)a  109.0 18.8  112.1 13.0  72  -0.82  .417  -0.19 
BDI  11.7 10.7  6.0 5.1  74  2.98  .004  0.68 
AQ  40.2 4.8  15.8 3.9  74  24.43  <.001  5.58 
EQb  20.2 9.9  45.6 10.6  72  -10.63  <.001  -2.48 
SQb  42.2 16.3  25.9 10.1  72  5.25  <.001  1.2 
 
Note. WIE = Wechsler Intelligenztest für Erwachsene, BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory, AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient, EQ = Empathizing Quotient, SQ = 
Systemizing Quotient 
aTwo participants diagnosed with autism completed an older version of the 
intelligence test (WAIS-R, German version; Tewes, 1994) and were thus excluded 
from these analyses. 
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bTwo participants diagnosed with autism did not complete the EQ and SQ and were 
thus excluded from the analyses. 
 
Furthermore, there was no difference in intelligence between participants 
diagnosed with autism (M = 109.0, SD = 18.8) and participants in the control group 
(M = 112.1, SD = 13.0), t(72) = -.82, p = .417, d = -0.19.  
Participants diagnosed with autism had higher BDI scores (Beck & Steer, 
1987; Hautzinger, 1995) (M = 11.7, SD = 10.7) than participants in the control group 
(M = 6.0, SD = 5.1), t(74) = 2.98, p = .004, d = 0.68.  
As expected, participants diagnosed with autism scored higher on the AQ 
(HFA: M = 40.2, SD = 4.8; Control: M = 15.8, SD = 3.9), t(74) = 24.43, p < .001, d = 
5.58, lower on the EQ (HFA: M = 20.2, SD = 9.9; Control: M = 45.6, SD = 10.6), 
t(72) = -10.63, p < .001, d = -2.48, and higher on the SQ (HFA: M = 42.2, SD = 16.3; 
Control: M = 25.9, SD = 10.1), t(72) = 5.25, p < .001, d = 1.2. 
Stimulus materials. In the detection task, participants’ accuracy to detect 
when a realistic virtual character was gazing directly at them was tested. To assess 
whether participants were generally able to perform the cognitive processes to solve 
the task, they also completed a non-social control task with a geometric stimulus.  
As the stimulus in the social condition, the same male virtual character from 
the pilot study (see Figure 9a) was used. The virtual character was moving its eyes 
and fixated at different positions. Fixations included direct gaze, slightly averted gaze, 
and clearly averted gaze. To reduce the time of the experiment, a shorter gaze 
sequence as opposed to the pilot study was used with 5 hits and 14 distractors. At the 
beginning of each trial, the virtual character showed clearly averted gaze (15° – 25° 
on the y-axis). After that, it moved his eyes to a fixation point of either 0° (hit) or 1-7° 
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(false alarm). The timing was the same as in the pilot study, with each trial lasting 
either 4,000 ms or 6,000 ms. Participants used a mouse to signal when the virtual 
character was showing direct gaze, clicking the left mouse button each time they felt 
the virtual character was gazing directly at them. 
The non-social stimulus was a grey rectangle with a black cross (see Figure 
9c). It had approximately the size of one of the virtual character’s eyes (height = 1 
cm, length = 2.5 cm). The cross was moving inside the rectangle and paused at 
different positions—directly in the center of the rectangle, slightly off-center, and 
clearly off-center. At the beginning of each trial, the cross started in a position that 
was clearly off-center (15° – 25° on the y-axis) and then moved to a point of either 0° 
(hit) or 1-7° (false alarm). The geometric stimulus used the same sequence of hits and 
distractors as the social stimulus. The timing was the same as in the social task. 
Again, participants used a mouse to signal when the cross was directly in the center of 
the rectangle. The design was a 2 (stimulus: social vs. non-social) × 2 (group: HFA 
vs. control) mixed-design, with stimulus as a within-subjects factor and group as a 
between-subjects factor. Both experimental tasks were presented in random order. 
Dependent variables were reaction times, the number of correct responses (hits) and 
the number of false alarms. In addition, participants rated the pleasantness (1 = very 
unpleasant to 5 = very pleasant) and difficulty (1 = very easy to 5 = very difficult) of 
every task on a 5-point scale. 
In the setting task, participants’ accuracy to actively establish direct gaze with 
a realistic virtual character was tested. Participants also completed a geometric control 
task to assess their ability to solve the task in a non-social setting. The setting task 
used the same stimuli as the detection task. However, instead of detecting when the 
virtual character was gazing at them, participants actively established direct gaze 
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using the mouse. Both the social and the non-social condition of the setting task in the 
main experiment consisted of 21 trials. In each trial, the eyes of the virtual character 
appeared in a random position. Participants then used the mouse to move the eyes of 
the virtual character into a position that matched direct gaze as closely as possible. 
When the participants had established that position, they pressed a button on the 
mouse and the eyes of the virtual character moved to a new random position. In 
contrast to the pilot study, the rotation of the virtual character's head was not varied. 
There was no time limit for each trial to allow the participants to work as accurately 
as possible.  
The task in the non-social condition was similar to the task in the social 
condition. However, instead of controlling the virtual character's eyes, participants 
tried to center the cross in the center of the rectangle. The design was a 2 (stimulus: 
social vs. non-social) × 2 (group: HFA vs. control) mixed-design, with stimulus as a 
within-subjects factor and group as a between-subjects factor. Both experimental 
tasks were presented in random order. Dependent variables were reaction times and 
the degree of deviation from a perfect eye contact. Additionally, participants 
evaluated the pleasantness (1 = very unpleasant to 5 = very pleasant) and difficulty (1 
= very easy to 5 = very difficult) of every task on a 5-point scale. 
Procedure. The participants diagnosed with autism were tested at the 
Department of Psychiatry at the University Hospital of a large city in Western 
Germany. The control participants were tested at the Department of Psychology of the 
University in the same city. Prior to the experiment, all participants gave consent to 
participate. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. The 
experimental stimuli were presented on a 17-in. monitor with a resolution of 1280 x 
1024 pixels. The experimental procedure was the same as in the pilot study. However, 
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in addition to the detection and the setting task with the realistic virtual character, 
participants also completed both tasks with the non-social stimulus. Each participant 
completed all tasks in one single session. To eliminate carry-over-effects, all tasks 
were presented in random order. 
Results and Discussion 
Detection task. To compare both groups' ability to detect direct gaze, a 
sensitivity index d' was calculated out of the number of correct responses and the 
number of false alarms. Sensitivity d' was compared in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group 
× stimulus). There was a significant main effect of stimulus on d', F(1, 74) = 57.0, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .435. There was also a significant main effect of group on d', F(1, 74) = 
5.13, p = .026, ηp2 = .065. There was no significant interaction effect between 
stimulus and group, F(1, 74) = 0.80, p = .375, ηp2 = .011. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed comparing the differences in d' of the HFA and the control group in the 
social and non-social test conditions. These revealed a significant difference in the 
social condition, t(74) = -2.27, p = .026, d = -0.51. There was no significant difference 
in the non-social condition, t(74) = -1.46, p = .149, d = -0.33. This suggests that when 
confronted with the non-social stimulus participants diagnosed with autism (M = 0.99, 
SD = 0.54) were as sensitive at detecting when the geometric stimulus was centered as 
participants in the control group (M = 1.15, SD = 0.41). When dealing with the virtual 
character, however, participants in the HFA group (M = 0.45, SD = 0.60) were less 
sensitive at detecting direct gaze than participants in the control group (M = 0.72, SD 
= 0.45) (see Figure 13a). 
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Figure 13. Overall results of the detection task in the main experiment: (a) false 
alarms, (b) reaction times, (c) pleasantness of the task, and (d) difficulty of the task. 
Error bars represent 95%-CI of the mean. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
Reaction times were analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group × stimulus). 
There was no significant main effect for stimulus, F(1, 74) = 0.74, p = .392, ηp2 = 
.010, or group, F(1, 74) = 0.77, p = .383, ηp2 = .010. There was also no significant 
interaction effect between stimulus and group, F(1, 74) = 2.87, p = .095, ηp2 = .037. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed no difference between the HFA group (M = 1,238 ms, 
SD = 242 ms) and the control group (M = 1,222 ms, SD = 250 ms) in the social 
condition, t(74) = 0.28, p = .777, d = 0.07. There was also no difference between the 
HFA group (M = 1,142 ms, SD = 303 ms) and the control group (M = 1,253 ms, SD = 
347 ms) in the non-social condition, t(74) = -1.49, p = .139, d = -0.34 (see Figure 
13b). 
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Perceived pleasantness of the task was analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA 
(group × stimulus). There was no significant main effect for stimulus, F(1, 74) = 0.67, 
p = .415, ηp2 = .009. There was a significant main effect for group, F(1, 74) = 4.55, p 
= .036, ηp2 = .058. There was also a significant interaction effect between stimulus 
and group, F(1, 74) = 20.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .213. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed to compare both groups in the social and non-social condition. Perceived 
pleasantness did differ significantly between the HFA group (M = 2.84, SD = 1.09) 
and the control group (M = 3.90, SD = 0.94) in the social condition, t(74) = -4.54, p < 
.001, d = -1.04. This indicates that individuals with autism did perceive the social task 
to be less pleasant than participants in the control group, whereas in the non-social 
condition there was no difference in perceived pleasantness of the task between the 
HFA group (M = 3.35, SD = 1.27) and the control group (M = 3.15, SD = 0.96), t(74) 
= 0.77, p = .446, d = 0.18 (see Figure 13c).  
Perceived difficulty of the task was analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group 
× stimulus). There was no significant main effect for stimulus, F(1, 73) = 1.74, p = 
.192, ηp2 = .023. There was also no significant main effect for group, F(1, 73) = 2.98, 
p = .089, ηp2 = .039. The interaction between stimulus and group was not significant, 
F(1, 73) = 3.23, p = .076, ηp2 = .042. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant 
difference between the HFA group (M = 3.14, SD = 1.03) and the control group (M = 
2.47, SD = 1.22) in the social condition, t(73) = 2.53, p = .014, d = 0.59, suggesting 
that participants diagnosed with autism did perceive the social task to be more 
difficult than participants in the control group. The HFA group (M = 3.10, SD = 1.25) 
and the control group (M = 3.00, SD = 1.12) did not differ in their perception of the 
difficulty of the non-social task, t(73) = 0.20, p = .844, d = 0.08 (see Figure 13d). 
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Setting task. Degrees of deviation from a perfect direct gaze were analyzed in 
a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group × stimulus). There was a significant main effect for 
stimulus, F(1, 74) = 246.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .769. There was no significant main effect 
for group, F(1, 74) = 2.39, p = .126, ηp2 = .031. There was no significant interaction 
effect between stimulus and group, F(1, 74) = 0.07, p = .745, ηp2 = .001. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed no significant difference between the HFA group (M = 4.95, SD 
= 1.68) and the control group (M = 4.62, SD = 1.39) in the social condition, t(74) = 
0.94, p = .353, d = 0.21. There was also no significant difference between the HFA 
group (M = 2.46, SD = 1.16) and the control group (M = 2.02, SD = 0.77) in the non-
social condition, t(74) = 1.94, p = .056, d = 0.45. This indicates that there was no 
difference in accuracy between participants diagnosed with autism and participants in 
the control group on either the social or non-social setting task (see Figure 14a). 
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Figure 14. Overall results of the setting task in the main experiment: (a) degrees of 
deviation, (b) reaction times, (c) pleasantness of the task, and (d) difficulty of the 
task. Error bars represent 95%-CI of the mean. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
Reaction times were analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group × stimulus). 
There was a significant main effect for stimulus, F(1, 74) = 24.86, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.251. There was no significant main effect for group, F(1, 74) = 0.21, p = .648, ηp2 = 
.003. There was also no significant interaction effect between stimulus and group, 
F(1, 74) = 0.36, p = .550, ηp2 = .005. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant 
difference between the HFA group (M = 5,736 ms, SD = 2,363 ms) and the control 
group in the social condition (M = 5,308 ms, SD = 1,573 ms), t(74) = 0.94, p = .353, d 
= 0.21. There was also no significant difference between the HFA group (M = 6,978 
ms, SD = 3,882 ms) and the control group (M = 6,889 ms, SD =2,732 ms) in the non-
social condition, t(74) = 0.12, p = .908, d = 0.03. This indicates that both groups 
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needed a comparable amount of time to complete the task, and that there was no 
speed-accuracy trade-off in either of the groups (see Figure 14b) 
Perceived pleasantness of the task was analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA 
(group × stimulus). There was no significant main effect for stimulus, F(1, 74) = 3.47, 
p = .066, ηp2 = .045. There was a significant main effect for group, F(1, 74) = 7.91, p 
= .006, ηp2 = .097. There was also a significant interaction effect between stimulus 
and group, F(1, 74) = 17.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .193. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed to compare both groups in the social and non-social condition. Perceived 
pleasantness did differ significantly between the HFA group (M = 2.78, SD = 1.27) 
and the control group (M = 4.08, SD = 0.87) in the social condition, t(74) = -5.20, p < 
.001, d = -1.19, indicating that individuals diagnosed with autism did perceive the 
social task to be less pleasant than participants in the control group. There was no 
difference in perceived pleasantness of the task between the HFA group (M = 3.19, 
SD = 1.27) and the control group (M = 3.03, SD = 1.18) in the non-social condition, 
t(74) = 0.58, p = .562, d = 0.13 (see Figure 14c). 
Perceived difficulty of the task was analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group 
× stimulus). There was a significant main effect for stimulus, F(1, 73) = 9.27, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .113. There was no significant main effect for group, F(1, 73) = 1.82, p = 
.182, ηp2 = .024. However, there was a significant interaction effect between stimulus 
and group, F(1, 73) = 5.79, p = .019, ηp2 = .073. Pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significant difference between the HFA group (M = 2.59, SD = 1.3) and the control 
group (M = 1.89, SD = 1.01) in the social condition, t(73) = 2.61, p = .011, d = 0.60, 
meaning that participants diagnosed with autism did perceive the social task to be 
more difficult than participants in the control group. There was no difference between 
the HFA group (M = 2.70, SD = 1.29) and the control group (M = 2.82, SD = 1.16) in 
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the perception of the difficulty of the task in the non-social condition, t(73) = -0.40, p 
= .690, d = -0.10 (see Figure 14d). 
General Discussion 
The main goal of the current experiments was to investigate whether adults 
diagnosed with HFA are impaired in their ability to detect direct gaze. In addition, it 
was also tested whether these gaze processing impairments could—at least in part—
be due to the uncontrollability of the social stimuli by giving participants control over 
the gaze of a realistic virtual character. 
The results of the detection task with the virtual character in both Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2 show that adult individuals with high-functioning autism are 
impaired in their ability to distinguish between direct and averted gaze. In the current 
study, this difficulty to distinguish between direct and averted gaze manifested itself 
in an increased rate of false alarms, which may suggest that when faced with 
ambiguous social gaze individuals with autism overcompensate by classifying gaze as 
direct that is in fact averted. 
 The results of the present study indicate that this finding may not be 
explained by a general deficit in the processing of moving stimuli because individuals 
with autism performed as well as participants in the control group on the detection 
task with the geometric, non-social stimulus in the main experiment. However, it is 
important to note that the present study did only find significant main effects for 
group and stimulus and no significant interaction between stimulus and group. 
Therefore, it is possible that with a larger sample size the present study may have also 
detected a significant difference between both groups in the non-social condition, 
which would hint at a deficit in the processing of non-social stimuli. However, this 
effect in the non-social condition was only small compared to the effect in the social 
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condition and may not explain the impaired performance of individuals with autism in 
the social condition. Interestingly, both groups performed better on the non-social 
than on the social task, which suggests that the social condition was more demanding 
for both individuals with autism and participants in the control group. 
These results are in contrast to previous studies (Senju et al., 2005; Senju et 
al., 2008; Webster & Potter, 2011), which have not shown clear deficits in the 
detection of direct gaze. This might be in part due to the different methodologies used 
by the other studies. Whereas Senju et al. (2008) used a visual search task with static 
stimuli showing only two different kinds of gaze (direct or averted), the present study 
used a realistic virtual character showing dynamic gaze behavior with fine-tuned 
variations. Even though Webster and Potter (2011) did use different degrees of 
averted gaze (20°, 10°, and 5°), they presented their participants with two images side 
by side, one displaying direct gaze and the other displaying averted gaze, which might 
have made the task considerably easier than the task used in the present study. The 
present findings support the idea that the study of gaze behavior in autism can benefit 
from stimuli that are both dynamic and realistic (Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001; 
Wilms et al., 2010). 
Now that it has been established that individuals with autism are impaired in 
the detection of direct gaze, it is important to determine the processes that lead to less 
accurate gaze detection. At least two explanations seem possible: 
First, the gaze behavior of the virtual character was highly unpredictable, 
which might have interfered with the autistic participants’ ability to detect direct gaze. 
As has been stated by the empathizing-systemizing theory (Baron-Cohen, Richler, 
Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003), individuals with autism prefer situations 
that can be predicted and controlled. Previous studies have shown that children with 
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autism favor predictable environments over unpredictable environments (Ferrara & 
Hill, 1980; Klin et al., 2009) and show more problematic behaviors, such as self-hits 
and aggression, in unpredictable environments (Flannery & Horner, 1994). During the 
detection task in the present study, participants were confronted with the possibility of 
being gazed at by a virtual character. This possibility of becoming engaged in social 
interaction may have been aversive for the individuals with autism and could have 
interfered with their ability to accurately detect direct gaze. This would explain why 
the individuals with autism did not differ from the typically developing individuals in 
the setting task, where the virtual character did not show unpredictable gaze behavior 
and was instead controlled by the participants. 
Second, the individuals with autism may have averted their gaze from the 
virtual character and were therefore not able to accurately detect when the virtual 
character was gazing at them. As has been shown in previous studies, when 
confronted with social stimuli, individuals with autism avert their gaze to avoid 
looking at the stimulus (Corden et al., 2008; Hutt & Ounsted, 1966; Richer & Coss, 
1976). Thus, it might be possible that the individuals with autism did not attend to the 
eye region in the detection task and therefore did not accurately detect direct gaze. In 
the setting task, individuals with autism performed as accurate as participants in the 
control group. Therefore, the predictability of the situation may have influenced the 
gaze behavior of the participants with autism causing them to show less gaze 
aversion. However, without eye-tracking data it can only be speculated about the 
relation between gaze aversion, task performance, and predictability. Thus, a 
replication of the present study should include eye-tracking data to determine which 
regions of the face individuals with autism fixate on during the different tasks. 
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As indicated by the results of the questionnaire data in the main experiment, 
individuals with autism experienced the detection task with the virtual character as 
less pleasant than participants in the control group. These results are in concordance 
with previous studies showing that social stimuli, such as faces, are less pleasant for 
individuals with autism and that they prefer non-social stimuli (Corden et al., 2008; 
Hutt & Ounsted, 1966; Richer & Coss, 1976). 
As for the reaction times of the detection task in both the pilot study and the 
main experiment, individuals with autism did not differ from control persons in 
reaction times in any of the detection tasks, suggesting that there was no trade-off 
between speed and accuracy in any of the two groups. 
The results of the setting task with the virtual character in both the pilot study 
and the main experiment show that individuals with autism are in fact able to 
establish direct gaze accurately when they have full control over a social stimulus. 
When looking at the degrees of deviation from direct gaze in the main experiment, it 
is important to note that in the setting task individuals with autism were able to 
distinguish more accurately between direct or averted gaze than in the detection task. 
Whereas in the setting task individuals with autism perceived gaze between 0° and 
4.95° to be direct, in the detection task individuals with autism indicated gaze to be 
direct that was more than 5° averted. Why were the individuals with autism more 
accurate at detecting direct gaze in the setting task as opposed to the detection task? 
First, the setting task was more predictable. Whereas in the detection task the virtual 
character showed unpredictable gaze behavior, the gaze in the setting task was 
controlled by the participants, making it highly predictable. If the unpredictability of 
the gaze behavior interfered with the autistic participants’ ability to detect direct gaze 
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in the detection task, then in the setting task participants with autism could focus more 
easily on the gaze of the virtual character. 
Second, one important difference between both tasks is that there was no time 
limit in the setting task. In the setting task in the main experiment, participants in the 
HFA group took about 5.7 s on average to establish direct gaze with the virtual 
character. In the detection task, on the other hand, the eyes of the virtual character 
were moving, so the time to make a decision about the virtual character’s gaze was 
limited. This was also reflected in participants’ reaction times, with the average 
reaction time in the detection task being about 1.2 s. In the pilot study, individuals 
with autism also did take significantly longer to complete the setting task than 
participants in the control group. However, in the main experiment there was no 
difference in reaction times between both groups in the setting task. Thus, another 
important aspect for a future study might be to introduce also a time limit for the 
setting task to investigate whether individuals with autism can still benefit from 
control over the social stimulus if the time is limited. 
Furthermore, even though individuals with autism were as accurate as 
participants in the control group at establishing direct gaze in the setting task, it is not 
clear which strategy they used. Previous studies have argued that individuals with 
autism use a geometric strategy to process gaze (Ristic et al., 2005). Because the 
setting task in the main study used a virtual character directly facing the participants, 
it is possible that the individuals with autism used geometric cues, such as the 
symmetry of the pupils, to solve the task. To further investigate this possibility, a 
future study might also use a virtual character with a slightly averted head position, a 
technique that has been used by other studies to interfere with geometric processing of 
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gaze (Senju et al., 2008; Ashwin, Ashwin, Rhydderch, Howells, & Baron-Cohen, 
2009). 
With regard to the subjective experience during the tasks, individuals with 
autism did perceive both the setting and the detection task with the realistic virtual 
character to be less pleasant than participants in the control group. Thus, the 
controllability of the setting task did not cause individuals with autism to rate it as 
more pleasant. In addition, individuals with autism also did perceive both tasks as 
more difficult than participants in the control group. Taken together, both results 
indicate that the perceived pleasantness and difficulty of the tasks was more 
influenced by the social stimulus per se than by the characteristics of the tasks, 
suggesting a strong influence of the social nature of the task on experience. 
An important question for future studies is whether individuals with autism 
might be able to generalize skills gained in the setting task to other situations. A 
simple test would be to use the same paradigm as in the present study, but to ask 
participants to complete the setting task before the detection task. It might be possible 
that in this case participants with autism would be more accurate at detecting direct 
gaze. In the present study, the order of tasks was randomized so such training effects 
could not be investigated. 
On the whole, the results of the setting task show that individuals with autism 
might be able to improve their ability to detect direct gaze by giving them control 
over or providing a handle for social stimuli. Previous studies have begun to focus on 
developing training programs for individuals with autism: For instance, Golan et al. 
(2009) created an animated series of tank engines with faces to teach children with 
autism to recognize emotions. Children with autism that had watched the series for 
four weeks significantly improved in their ability to detect emotions compared to 
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those who did not watch the series. In another study, Faja, Aylward, Bernier, and 
Dawson (2008) used a face training program to help autistic children improve their 
ability to recognize faces. After eight training sessions, the ability to detect faces 
improved. However, both studies did not make use of controllable stimuli. The results 
suggest that presenting individuals with autism with a virtual character that can be 
made responsive and be controlled might also prove useful in the teaching of social 
skills (Wilms et al., 2010). 
As for further clinical implications of the present study, the results of the 
detection task show a tendency by the participants diagnosed with autism to classify 
averted gaze as direct. This tendency may be a source for misunderstandings in social 
interactions because some communicative actions, such as turn-taking, rely on 
accurately interpreting the gaze cues of the interaction partner. If individuals with 
autism mistake averted gaze for direct gaze, they may misinterpret that direct gaze for 
a turn-taking signal and interrupt their interaction partner. Because there is some 
evidence that turn-taking in autism may be abnormal (Baron-Cohen, 1988), based on 
the present results the role of gaze in turn-taking in autism needs to be further 
investigated. 
Several limitations apply to the present study. First, the study focused only on 
individuals with high-functioning autism. Even though it might be concluded that 
non-high-functioning individuals with autism are also impaired in the detection of 
direct gaze, this has to be investigated in a separate study. Furthermore, it is not clear 
if non-high-functioning individuals with autism would be similarly able to use a task 
that gives them full control over a social stimulus to train their ability to detect direct 
gaze. Second, the present study focused only on adults. As other authors have 
mentioned (Nation & Penny, 2008), a developmental perspective is important for the 
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understanding of autism to establish at which stage of development a certain deficit 
occurs. Third, the non-social, geometric stimulus was less visually complex than the 
virtual character. Therefore, a replication of the study should use a non-social 
stimulus that is more visually complex to better compare the performance on the 
social and non-social task. 
Taken together, the current study investigated whether individuals with autism 
are impaired in their ability to detect direct gaze. In addition, it was tested whether 
individuals with autism can overcome such an impairment when given the control 
over the gaze of a naturalistic virtual character. The results suggest that individuals 
with autism are impaired in their ability to distinguish between direct and averted 
gaze. This underlines the importance of using animate, realistic stimuli in experiments 
with individuals with autism, because the impairments specific to autism might not be 
fully detected using only static stimuli (Schilbach et al., 2011). Furthermore, when 
given the control over the gaze of a realistic virtual character, individuals with autism 
were as accurate as participants in the control group at establishing direct gaze, which 
suggests that giving individuals with autism control over a virtual character, or social 
stimuli in general, may be used to help them overcome some of their deficits in the 
processing of gaze. 
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Study 4: Perception of Attractiveness in Autism 
Introduction 
Attractiveness has a strong influence on our perception and judgment. We 
subscribe more positive attributes to people with attractive faces (Eagly, Ashmore, 
Makhijani, & Longo, 1991), treat them more positively (Langlois et al., 2000), and 
value objects more that are paired with attractive faces (Strick, Holland, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008). Furthermore, attractiveness plays an important role in sexual 
selection and mate choices (Grammer & Thornhill, 1994). 
Also, judgments of attractiveness and gaze are strongly linked (Shimojo, 
Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). We tend to spend more time looking at attractive 
faces (Maner et al., 2003), and when doing so reward centers in the brain are 
activated, such as the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
(Aharon et al., 2001; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Cloutier, Heatherton, Whalen, & Kelley, 
2008; Liang, Zebrowitz, & Zhang, 2010; Winston, O'Doherty, Kilner, Perrett, & 
Dolan, 2007). Even human infants prefer to look more at attractive faces than at 
unattractive faces (Langlois et al., 1987).  
Because adults with autism spectrum disorders show some deficits in the 
processing of faces (e.g., Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Jemel, Mottron, & 
Dawson, 2006) and in some cases atypical gaze to faces (e.g., Dalton et al., 2005), it 
is possible that the ability to detect attractiveness may be impaired in individuals with 
autism. The present study therefore investigated whether the perception of 
attractiveness is impaired in autism by having high-functioning adults with autism 
choose the more attractive face out of pairs of faces while their gaze behavior was 
being recorded. Additionally, it was investigated whether a systematic gaze bias 
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towards preferred faces—the gaze cascade effect (Shimojo et al., 2003)—could be 
replicated in individuals with autism. 
Perception of Attractiveness in Autism 
Two studies, so far, have tested the ability of individuals with autism to detect 
attractiveness: Da Fonseca et al. (2011) investigated whether children diagnosed with 
autism perceive the same faces as attractive as typically developing children and 
whether they also subscribe more positive attributes to those faces ("beauty is good"-
stereotype; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). Their results support the 
notion that the perception of attractiveness is preserved in autism. Children with 
autism did not differ in their ratings of the attractive faces from typically developing 
children, and they also rated the attractive faces to be more positive than the 
unattractive faces, showing that children with autism also use the "beauty is good"-
stereotype in their judgments. 
 However, contrary to the findings by da Fonseca et al. (2011), White et al. 
(2006) did find evidence for impaired perception of attractiveness in adults diagnosed 
with Asperger Syndrome. In their study, adults with Asperger Syndrome and controls 
rated the attractiveness of male and female faces. The results showed that participants 
with Asperger Syndrome were impaired in their ability to judge the attractiveness of 
faces but only of their own gender. 
Given these contradictory findings, it is important to further investigate 
whether high-functioning adults with autism are impaired in their ability to detect 
attractiveness.   
Visual Attention to Faces in Autism 
One possible explanation for an impaired perception of attractiveness in 
autism might be that individuals with autism differ in their visual attention to parts of 
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the face that are important for judging attractiveness, and therefore come to different 
judgments than typically developing individuals. There is a large body of studies that 
has investigated the visual attention of individuals with autism to different facial 
features, such as the eyes, nose, and mouth (for a review see Falck-Ytter & von 
Hofsten, 2011). Even though there are some studies that have found differences 
between individuals with autism and controls (e.g., Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008; Dalton 
et al., 2005), there are also studies that have found no differences (e.g., McPartland, 
Webb, Keehn, & Dawson, 2011; Georgescu et al., 2013; Rutherford & Towns, 2008). 
For instance, Louwerse et al. (2013) found no difference in the time spent fixating at 
the eye-region between individuals with autism and controls. It therefore remains an 
open question whether visual attention to different facial features differs in high-
functioning individuals with autism from typically developing adults and whether 
these differences might help to explain potential deficits in the detection of 
attractiveness. 
Gaze Cascade Effect 
The gaze cascade model was proposed by Shimojo et al. (2003) to explain 
how human gaze and preferences are linked. According to the model, our gaze does 
not only reflect our preferences ("I am gazing at what I prefer.") but also influences 
what we prefer ("I prefer what I am gazing at."). In their original study, Shimojo et al. 
(2003) presented their participants with pairs of faces and asked them to choose the 
more attractive face. At the end of each trial, they found an increased bias to gaze at 
the chosen face. Shimojo et al. (2003) proposed two processes that might cause this 
gaze bias: mere exposure (Zajonc, 2001) and preferential looking (Birch, Shimojo, & 
Held, 1985). According to the mere exposure effect, stimuli are preferred simply 
because we are exposed to them. Preferential looking describes the phenomenon that 
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humans increase exposure to preferred stimuli. According to Shimojo et al. (2003) 
these two processes work together in a positive feedback-loop to produce the gaze 
cascade effect: At the beginning of each trial there is no preference for any of the two 
faces, and both faces are each likely to be gazed at. However, due to random factors 
one of the two faces will be gazed at more. Due to the mere exposure effect, the 
valence of this face will increase. At which point, preferential looking will lead to 
more gaze to this face, which will then again increase the valence of this face. This 
feedback-loop will continue up to the point where a conscious decision is made.  
According to the gaze cascade model, the strongest gaze bias will occur if the 
two stimuli are very similar in attractiveness. Under these circumstances, gaze can 
play a larger role in forming the decision. If both stimuli differ in attractiveness, the 
influence of gaze behavior on the decision will be weaker because the decision will be 
more strongly influenced by features inherent in the stimulus. To test this aspect, 
Shimojo et al. (2003) presented their participants with three different tasks: In the first 
task, the two faces in each pair had a large difference in attractiveness, with one face 
being very attractive and the other face being very unattractive. In the second task, the 
two faces were of equal attractiveness. In the third task, Shimojo et al. (2003) 
presented participants with abstract shapes that were supposed to be equally 
attractive. In line with the gaze cascade model, the strongest gaze bias was found in 
task two and three, in which both stimuli in each pair were similar in attractiveness. 
To further support the idea that gaze behavior actively influences the decision 
process, Shimojo et al. (2003) actively manipulated participants gaze by alternatively 
flashing the two faces and increasing the duration of one face and decreasing the 
duration of the other face—thus, mimicking participants' gaze behavior found in the 
previous study. The results showed that participants were more likely to choose the 
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face to which their gaze had been guided. To rule out the possibility that mere 
exposure alone accounted for the results and that the decision was not driven by the 
gaze shifts of the eyes, participants in one control condition simply focused on a 
fixation cross between both faces. In this control condition without gaze shifts, 
participants did not show a bias to choose the longer presented stimulus. 
To rule out the possibility that participants simply gazed at the chosen 
alternative, Shimojo et al. (2003) asked participants in two control conditions to 
choose the rounder face or the more unattractive face. In these control conditions, the 
likelihood to gaze at the chosen face before the decision was much lower (only 
around 55–65%). These results show that there is a slight tendency to gaze at the 
chosen alternative; however, the likelihood to gaze at the chosen face in the 
preference condition was much higher (around 80%), showing that in preference 
judgments gaze and choice are more strongly linked and this link cannot be explained 
by a simple tendency to gaze at the chosen stimulus. 
To further support the gaze cascade effect, Simion and Shimojo (2007) again 
presented participants with two faces; however, in some trials the faces disappeared 
before participants could make a choice. The gaze behavior of the participants showed 
a bias toward the chosen face—even if that face was not visible anymore, further 
supporting the link between gaze and decision. 
However, the gaze cascade effect has also been criticized. For instance, even 
though Glaholt and Reingold (2009) were able to replicate the gaze cascade effect, 
they were not able to actively produce a gaze bias towards certain stimuli by 
increasing their exposure. These results are in line with a study by Nittono and Wada 
(2009) who also replicated the gaze cascade effect but were not able to actively 
produce a gaze bias in participants towards certain stimuli. However, both studies 
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(Glaholt & Reingold, 2009; Nittono & Wada, 2009) did differ from the original study 
by Shimojo et al. (2003) in their use of stimuli. Whereas Shimojo et al. (2003) used 
faces, the studies by Glaholt and Reingold (2009) and Nittono and Wada (2009) used 
abstract shapes or photographs. Therefore, Nittono and Wada (2009) argued that the 
gaze cascade effect may be limited to faces.  
Now that the gaze cascade effect has been established as a phenomenon in 
preference decisions, the question remains whether it can also be found in individuals 
with autism. However, for the gaze cascade effect to work, some form of self-
monitoring of one's own gaze—conscious or unconscious—is needed. At least one 
study hints at the fact that individuals with autism may be impaired in their sense of 
agency with regard to their own gaze. In a study using a gaze-contingent lense, 
Grynszpan et al. (2012) could show that individuals with autism had difficulty at 
adapting their gaze when they controlled a gaze-contingent lense. In addition, only 
one participant in the HFA group noticed that the lense could be controlled with the 
gaze compared to 50% in the control group. Based on these findings Grynszpan et al. 
(2012) concluded that self-monitoring of gaze may be impaired in individuals with 
autism. Thus, if the self-monitoring of gaze in high-functioning autism is impaired, it 
is questionable if the gaze behavior can have an impact on decision making as 
proposed by the gaze cascade model. 
Up until now, one study has investigated the gaze cascade effect in individuals 
with autism. Using the original paradigm by Shimojo et al. (2003), Gharib et al. 
(2011) were able to replicate the gaze cascade effect in a sample of individuals with 
autism. Additionally, Gharib et al. (2011) could show an increased bias towards the 
chosen face in the participants with autism during the last 40 ms before the decision. 
This study, however, suffered from two major shortcomings: First, the sample size 
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was very small (HFA: 4, Control: 3), which may have resulted in an increased 
influence of outliers on the results. Second, the stimuli in the study were not validated 
in a prestudy, so it was not possible to test whether individuals with autism are 
generally impaired in the perception of attractiveness. Both shortcomings were 
addressed in the present study by using a larger sample size and by validating the 
stimuli in two prestudies.  
In sum, the gaze cascade effect describes the interplay between mere exposure 
and preferential looking that leads to an increased gaze bias towards one of two faces 
in a two-alternative forced choice preference decision. In this study, the goal was to 
replicate this effect in individuals with high-functioning autism. 
To summarize, the aim of the present study was twofold: First, it was 
investigated whether individuals with autism are impaired in their ability to detect 
attractiveness in faces. Second, the present study examined whether the findings on 
the relation between gaze and preference decisions found in typically developing 
individuals (e.g., Shimojo et al., 2003; Glaholt & Reingold, 2011) could be replicated 
in individuals with autism. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Thirty adults with high-functioning autism (20 male, 10 female; 
Mage = 43.3, age range: 23–55 years) were recruited at the Adult Autism Outpatient 
Clinic of the Department of Psychiatry at the University Hospital of a large city in 
Western Germany. All participants with high-functioning autism were diagnosed by 
two independent physicians according to ICD-10 criteria. Thirty control participants 
(20 male, 10 female; Mage = 41.2, age range: 33–63 years) were recruited at the 
Department of Psychology at the University of a large city in Western Germany. Both 
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groups were matched for age, gender, and intelligence (measured with the German 
version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WIE – Wechsler Intelligenztest 
für Erwachsene; Von Aster et al., 2006). Participants also completed the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, 1995), the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2006), the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen 
& Wheelwright, 2004), and the Systemizing Quotient (Wheelwright et al., 2006). The 
study protocol had been approved by the local ethics committee. 
On average, there was no difference in age between participants diagnosed with 
autism (M = 43.3, SD = 8.1) and participants in the control group (M = 41.2, SD = 
7.7), t(58) = 1.03, p = .307., d = 0.27. See Table 6 for an overview of demographic 
and psychopathological variables for both groups. 
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Table 6 
Demographic, Psychopathological, and IQ results for the Main Experiment 
  HFA 
(n = 30) 
 Control 
(n = 30) 
        
Variable  M SD  M SD  df  t  p  Cohen's d 
Age (years)  43.3 8.1  41.2 7.7  58  1.03  .307  0.27 
WIE verbal IQa  117.1 16.3  110.7 12.3  55  1.70  .096  0.44 
WIE performance IQa  107.3 18.1  104.3 16.0  55  0.66  .515  0.18 
WIE IQ (total)a  113.9 17.5  108.4 13.3  55  1.33  .191  0.35 
BDIb  15.1 10.9  7.8 5.9  57  3.21  .002  0.83 
AQ  41.7 4.3  17.5 6.2  58  17.68  <.001  4.53 
EQc  15.6 8.3  41.9 12.1  55  -9.50  <.001  -2.53 
SQc  41.3 15.8  26.2 10.0  55  4.35  <.001  1.14 
 
Note. WIE = Wechsler Intelligenztest für Erwachsene, BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory, AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient, EQ = Empathizing Quotient, SQ = 
Systemizing Quotient 
aThree participants diagnosed with autism completed an older version of the 
intelligence test (WAIS-R, German version; Tewes, 1994) and were thus excluded 
from these analyses. 
bOne participant in the control group did not complete the BDI and was thus excluded 
from the analyses. 
cThree participants diagnosed with autism did not complete the EQ and SQ and were 
thus excluded from the analyses. 
 
Furthermore, there was no difference in intelligence between participants 
diagnosed with autism (M = 113.9, SD = 17.5) and participants in the control group 
(M = 108.4, SD = 13.3), t(55) = 1.33, p = .191, d = 0.35.  
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Participants diagnosed with autism had higher BDI scores (Beck & Steer, 
1987; Hautzinger, 1995) (M = 15.1, SD = 10.9) than participants in the control group 
(M = 7.8, SD = 5.9), t(57) = 3.21, p = .002, d = 0.83.  
As expected, participants diagnosed with autism scored higher on the AQ 
(HFA: M = 41.7, SD = 4.3; Control: M = 17.5, SD = 6.2), t(58) = 17.68, p < .001, d = 
4.53, lower on the EQ (HFA: M = 15.6, SD = 8.3; Control: M = 41.9, SD = 12.1), 
t(55) = -9.50, p < .001., d = -2.53, and higher on the SQ (HFA: M = 41.3, SD = 15.8; 
Control: M = 26.2, SD = 10.0), t(55) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 1.14. 
Stimulus materials and design.  
Experimental task. Experiments on the relation between gaze and preference 
generally use a forced-choice paradigm (e.g., Shimojo et al., 2003; Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011): Participants are presented with two or more stimuli from the same 
category (e.g., faces, shapes, or objects) and have to choose the preferred one while 
their gaze behavior is being recorded. Viewing time for each pair of stimuli is usually 
not restricted. The present study used the same basic paradigm by Shimojo et al. 
(2003) with three different tasks.  
The goal of the first task (face-attractiveness-detection task) was to investigate 
participants' ability to detect attractiveness by presenting them with pairs of faces, 
consisting of one attractive and one unattractive face, which had been selected based 
on a prestudy. Participants' task was to select the more attractive face. 
The goal of the second task (face-gaze-preference task) was to examine the 
relation between participants' gaze behavior and their preference choices. As Shimojo 
et al. (2003) could show, gaze has a stronger influence on decision making when two 
stimuli are similar in attractiveness because in this case the decision is not so strongly 
influenced by features of the stimulus. In this task, participants were presented with 
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pairs of faces, consisting of two faces that were similar with regard to attractiveness. 
Again, participants' task was to select the more attractive face. 
The goal of the third task (shape-gaze-preference task) was also to examine 
the relation between participants' gaze behavior and their preference choices. 
However, instead of faces participants were presented with pairs of abstract shapes 
that were similar with regard to attractiveness. This was done for two reasons: First, 
several studies have shown that cognitive impairments in autism are primarily found 
with social stimuli (e.g., Dichter & Belger, 2007). It is therefore important to include 
a non-social control condition to investigate whether impairments are limited to social 
stimuli or even extend to non-social domains. Second, in their original study, Shimojo 
et al. (2003) found the strongest gaze cascade effect in the non-social condition and it 
is thus important to check if this finding can be replicated. 
To summarize, the basic structure of the experiment was as follows: In each of 
the three tasks, participants were presented with 20 stimulus pairs (faces or shapes) 
and their task was to choose the more attractive stimulus. In each trial, participants' 
choice, reaction time, and gaze behavior were recorded. The position of each stimulus 
in each trial was randomized. Additionally, the order of all three tasks was also 
randomized. 
If the detection of attractiveness is impaired in individuals with autism, a task 
demanding participants to detect attractiveness might be perceived as difficult. 
Therefore, participants were also asked to rate how easy it was for them to judge the 
attractiveness of the faces/shapes on a 7-point scale (1 = very easy to 7 = very 
difficult).  
Face stimuli. For the face-attractiveness-detection task the goal was to create 
20 pairs of avatars that had a large difference in attractiveness, with one avatar in each 
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pair being more attractive than the other avatar. For the face-gaze-preference task the 
goal was to create 20 pairs of avatars that had a small difference in attractiveness, 
with both avatars in each pair being about equally attractive. 
To select appropriate stimuli for both the face-attractiveness-detection task 
and the face-gaze-preference task, 52 male and 59 female avatars were created using 
the software FaceGen (Singular Inversions, 2011).  
To gather attractiveness ratings for the facial stimuli, a prestudy with 52 
participants (12 male, 41 female; Mage = 24.1; SDage = 3.1) was conducted. In the 
prestudy, each participant was presented with half of the avatars and rated the 
attractiveness of each avatar on a scale ranging from 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very 
attractive). Based on the mean attractiveness ratings, avatars were paired together. 
Avatars in each pair were matched for gender, so that each pair included either two 
male or two female avatars. Two separate sets of avatar pairs were created. For the 
face-attractiveness-detection task, avatars were paired so that there was a large 
difference in the attractiveness ratings between the two avatars in each pair. For the 
face-gaze-preference task, avatars were paired so that both avatars were very similar 
in their attractiveness ratings.  
To further validate the stimulus selection, a second prestudy with 103 
participants (21 male, 82 female; Mage = 23.9; SDage = 3.4) was conducted. In this 
prestudy, participants were presented with the 53 pairs of avatars that had been 
created based on the results of the first prestudy. Participants' task was to select the 
more attractive avatar in each pair. For each pair, the percentage that the more 
attractive avatar was chosen was calculated. For the face-attractiveness-detection task, 
the 10 male and 10 female pairs of avatars in which the attractive avatar was chosen 
more often than the unattractive avatar were selected. In the 20 final pairs (10 male, 
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10 female) selected for the study, the more attractive avatar was chosen on average 
80.75 percent of the time. With regard to the attractiveness ratings, the average 
difference between the attractive and the unattractive avatar in each of the pairs was 
1.07. In addition, the attractive avatars had significantly higher attractiveness ratings 
than the unattractive avatars, t(38) = 4.87, p < .001, d = 1.53.  
For the face-gaze-preference task, 10 male and 10 female pairs of avatars in 
which the attractive avatar was not chosen more often than the unattractive avatar 
were selected. In the 20 final pairs (10 male, 10 female), the more attractive avatar 
was chosen on average only 48.2 percent of the time. With regard to the attractiveness 
ratings, the average difference between the attractive and the unattractive avatar in 
each of the pairs was 0.25. In addition, the attractive avatars had only slightly higher 
attractiveness ratings than the unattractive avatars, t(37) = 2.03, p = .049, d = 0.64. 
In sum, both sets of stimuli matched the selection criteria. The 20 pairs for the 
face-attractiveness-detection task had a large difference in attractiveness, with one 
avatar in each pair being more attractive than the other avatar. The 20 pairs for the 
face-gaze-preference task had a small difference in attractiveness, with both avatars in 
each pair being about equally attractive. Figure 15 shows one pair of faces from the 
face-attractiveness detection task. 
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Figure 15. Pair of faces from the face-attractiveness-detection task. The more 
attractive face is on the right.  
Shape stimuli. For the shape-gaze-preference task the goal was to create 20 
pairs of abstract shapes that had a small difference in attractiveness, with both shapes 
in each pair being about equally attractive. 
To select appropriate stimuli for the shape-gaze-preference task, 40 different 
shape stimuli were created using the algorhythm by Gielis et al. (2003), which has 
been used in several psychophysiological experiments (e.g., Suchow & Alvarez, 
2011). The goal was to create 20 pairs of shapes in which there would be no clear 
preference for each one of the two shapes. Therefore, the forty shape stimuli were 
randomly paired to create 20 pairs of two shapes. The twenty pairs were also included 
in the second prestudy with the facial pairs. Thus, 103 participants (21 male, 82 
female; Mage = 23.9; SDage = 3.4) were presented with the pairs and chose the more 
attractive shape. Unlike for the facial stimuli, there were no attractiveness ratings for 
the shapes that could have been used to determine a more attractive shape in each 
pair. Therefore, the percentage for each pair that the left shape was chosen was 
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calculated. The left shape was chosen on average 51.75 percent of the time. Thus, 
there was no preference to select one shape over the other in each pair, and the shape 
stimuli also matched the selection criteria. Figure 16 shows one pair of shapes from 
the shape-gaze preference task. 
 
Figure 16. Pair of shapes from the shape-gaze-preference task. 
Procedure. The participants diagnosed with autism were tested at the 
Department of Psychiatry at the University Hospital of a large city in Western 
Germany. The control participants were tested at the Department of Psychology of the 
University in the same city. Prior to the experiment, all participants gave consent to 
participate. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. The 
experimental stimuli were presented on Tobii eye-tracker with a 17-in. monitor and a 
resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. Eye movements were recorded at a frequency of 50 
Hz. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter greeted the participants and 
told them that they were going to take part in an experiment on social perception. 
After that, they sat down in a chair approximately 50 cm from the computer. They 
positioned their head so that the eyes were looking at the center of the screen, and the 
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calibration of the eye-tracker was run. Participants then saw a black screen with white 
instructions explaining the first task. Participants could read the instructions at their 
own pace and then proceeded to the actual task. After they had completed the first 
task, participants proceeded to the instructions for the second task. To eliminate carry-
over-effects, all tasks were presented in random order. Participants rated the difficulty 
of the task on a paper questionnaire next to the computer. The experiment ended after 
participants had completed all three tasks. After the experiment, participants 
completed the BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, 1995), the AQ (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2006), the WAIS-R (Tewes, 1994). 
Results 
Behavioral data. 
Face-attractiveness-detection task. To compare both groups' ability to detect 
attractiveness, I calculated in how many of the 20 trials participants' correctly chose 
the more attractive avatar. There was a significant difference between the HFA group 
(M = 14.45, SD = 2.73) and the control group (M = 15.90, SD = 2.12), t(59) = -2.28, p 
= .026, d = -0.59, indicating that the participants in the HFA group were impaired in 
their ability to choose the more attractive avatar in each pair (see Figure 17). One 
participant diagnosed with autism was excluded from this analysis because he/she 
admitted to having answered randomly on the task without looking at the faces. 
However, even with this participant included, the difference between the HFA group 
(M = 14.30, SD = 2.81) and the control group (M = 15.90, SD = 2.12) was still 
significant, t(58) = 2.49, p = .016, d = -0.64. 
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Figure 17. Results of the face-attractiveness-detection task. Error bars represent 95 
%-CI of the mean. 
With regard to reaction times, there was no significant difference between the 
HFA group (M = 7,033 ms, SD = 4,805 ms) and the control group (M = 5,869 ms, SD 
= 3,217 ms), t(57) = -1.10, p = .278, d = 0.28. 
Perceived difficulty did differ significantly between the HFA group (M = 4.90, 
SD = 1.30) and the control group (M = 3.50, SD = 1.61), t(58) = 3.71, p < .001, d = 
0.96, meaning that participants with autism did find it more difficult than participants 
in the control group to choose the more attractive face. 
Because White et al. (2006) found that individuals with autism were less able 
to judge the attractiveness of faces of their own gender, I analyzed the number of 
correct trials, taking into account participants' gender and the gender of the stimuli. It 
is important to note that there were only ten females in both the HFA group (20 male, 
10 female) and the control group (20 male, 10 female). Therefore, the results should 
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number of females in their study (HFA: 10 male, 6 female; Control: 12 male, 10 
female). I performed a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group × participant gender × avatar 
gender), with group (HFA vs. Control) and participant gender (Male vs. Female) as 
between-subjects factors and avatar gender (Male vs. Female) as a within-subjects 
factor. 
There was a significant main effect of group, F(1, 55) = 4.62, p = .036, η2p = 
.077, indicating that participants diagnosed with autism were impaired in their ability 
to detect attractiveness. There was also a significant main effect of participant gender, 
F(1, 55) = 7.69, p = .008, η2p = .123, in the direction that males generally performed 
better than females. All other effects were not significant, all F < 1.89. Most 
importantly, the three-way interaction between group, avatar gender, and participant 
gender was not significant, F(1, 55) = 0.20, p = .655, η2p = .004. Taken together, the 
results show that participants in the HFA group generally performed worse on the 
face-attractiveness-detection task than participants in the control group. However, 
contrary to the findings by White et al. (2006) this impairment was not limited to 
faces of the own gender. 
Face-gaze-preference task. Pairs of avatars in the face-gaze-preference task 
were selected so that there was only a small difference in attractiveness between 
them, with both avatars in each pair being about equally attractive. Based on the 
results of the prestudy, I expected participants to choose the more attractive avatar 
only at chance level. In addition, I did not expect participants in the HFA group and 
the control group to differ on this task. As expected, there was no significant 
difference between the HFA group (M = 9.34, SD = 2.71) and the control group (M = 
9.53, SD = 2.55), t(57) = -0.28, p = .785, d = -0.07. 
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With regard to reaction times, there was again no significant difference 
between the HFA group (M = 6,747 ms, SD = 4,266 ms) and the control group (M = 
6,773 ms, SD = 3,673 ms), t(57) = -0.25, p = .980, d = -0.01. 
Shape-gaze-preference task. Pairs of shapes in the shape-gaze-preference task 
were selected so that there was only a small difference in attractiveness between 
them, with both shapes in each pair being about equally attractive. Again, based on 
the results of the prestudy, I did not expect participants to choose one of the two 
shapes in each pair over the other. In addition, I did not expect participants in the 
HFA group and the control group to differ on this task. As expected, there was no 
significant difference between the HFA group (M = 10.27, SD = 2.39) and the control 
group (M = 10.37, SD = 2.59), t(58) = -0.16, p = .877, d = -0.04. 
With regard to reaction times, there was no significant difference between the 
HFA group (M = 4,857 ms, SD = 3,111 ms) and the control group (M = 4,687 ms, SD 
= 2,674 ms), t(58) = 0.25, p = .821, d = 0.06. 
Perceived difficulty did not differ significantly between the HFA group (M = 
3.28, SD = 1.62) and the control group (M = 3.07, SD = 1.36), t(57) = 0.54, p = .594, 
d = 0.14, meaning that participants with autism did not find it more difficult than 
participants in the control group to choose the more attractive shape. 
Eye-tracking data. 
Preliminary analyses. To evaluate the quality of the eye-tracking data, the 
percentage of missing data was calculated for each participant. Fixations were 
calculated using a centroid method (Falkmer, Dahlman, Dukic, Bjällmark, & Larsson, 
2008). In line with previous studies (Manor & Gordon, 2003; McPartland et al., 
2011), fixations were defined as follows: For gaze to be classified as a fixation, 
participants' gaze had to be focused within a circular region on the screen with a 
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radius of 30 pixels, which corresponds to about one degree of visual angle, for a 
duration of 100 ms or longer. Gaze data from some participants had to be excluded 
because they had more than 20% of missing data and fixations could not be reliably 
calculated. Based on this criterion, data from five participants diagnosed with autism 
had to be excluded in each of the three experimental tasks. In addition, one participant 
with autism did not complete the face-gaze-preference task. 
Gaze cascade effect. Based on the procedure by Shimojo et al. (2003), I 
performed a gaze likelihood analysis for all three tasks. In line with Shimojo et al. 
(2003), only the last 2,500 ms before each participants' decision were analyzed, which 
is the mean reaction time for one trial minus one standard deviation. The gaze of the 
participants was tracked at a frequency of 50 MHz. Every tracking point at which the 
participants were gazing at the chosen face/shape was coded with a value of 1; every 
tracking point at which participants were gazing at the face/shape that they did not 
chose was coded with a value of 0. All tracking points were aligned backwards from 
the moment of the decision. To obtain the gaze likelihood curves for each task, I 
averaged for each tracking point across trials and participants. The resulting gaze 
likelihood curves show for each tracking point the probability that the chosen 
face/shape was gazed at (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. Gaze likelihood curves for participants in the HFA and control group. The 
gaze likelihood curves show for each tracking point the probability that participants 
were gazing at the chosen face/shape. (a) Face-attractiveness-detection task, (b) face-
gaze-preference task, and (c) shape-gaze-preference task.  
As can be seen in the gaze likelihood curves, up until about one second before 
the decision, there is no bias to look at either the chosen or not chosen face/shape. The 
probability to look at either of the two stimuli is at chance level (50%), indicating that 
participants are equally likely to gaze at the chosen or not chosen face/shape. 
However, at around 1,000 ms before the decision there was a continuous rise in the 
likelihood to gaze at the chosen face/shape in all three tasks. As can be seen in Figure 
18, both participants diagnosed with autism and participants in the control group 
showed a gaze cascade effect, indicated by an increasing bias to gaze at the chosen 
face/shape. The likelihood to gaze at the chosen face/shape was averaged for the last 
1,000 ms before the decision and compared against chance level (50%) using one-
sample t tests. The results in Table 7 show that both groups were significantly more 
likely to gaze at the chosen face/shape during the last 1,000 ms before the decision 
than at the not chosen face/shape. 
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Table 7 
Likelihood that Gaze was on the Chosen Face/Shape during the last 1,000 ms before 
the Decision 
Task Group 
Likelihood gaze on 
chosen face/shape df t p 
Face-attractiveness-detection HFA 68.1 (11.3) 24 8.02 < .001 
 Control 63.4 (9.1) 29 8.08 < .001 
Face-gaze-preference HFA 70.8 (10.2) 23 10.05 < .001 
 Control 65.4 (11.2) 29 7.57 < .001 
Face-shape-preference HFA 70.0 (10.2) 24 9.82 < .001 
 Control 65.7 (10.4) 29 8.29 < .001 
 
According to the gaze cascade model (Shimojo et al., 2003), the gaze cascade 
effect should be stronger if the two stimuli are very similar in attractiveness, which 
was the case in the face-gaze-preference task and the shape-gaze-preference task, 
because the gaze behavior has a stronger influence on the decision when it is not 
driven by stimulus features. In line with the original results by Shimojo et al. (2003), 
it was thus predicted that the likelihood to gaze at the chosen alternative would be 
higher in both the face-gaze-preference task and the shape-gaze-preference task than 
in the face-attractiveness-detection task. Additionally, it should be investigated if the 
gaze cascade effect differed between participants diagnosed with autism and 
participants in the control group. Therefore, the likelihood to gaze at the chosen 
face/shape during the last 1,000 ms before the decision was analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed 
ANOVA (group × task), with group (HFA vs. Control) as between-subjects factors 
and task (face-attractiveness-detection task vs. face-gaze-preference task vs. shape-
gaze-preference task) as a within-subjects factor. There was no significant main effect 
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for group, F(1, 50) = 2.45, p = .124, ηp2 = .047, indicating that there was no difference 
between both groups in the likelihood to gaze at the chosen face/shape. There was an 
almost significant main effect for task, F(2, 100) = 3.04, p = .052, ηp2 = .057. The 
interaction between group and task was not significant, F(2, 100) = 0.43, p = .652, ηp2 
= .009. Because of the predicted differences between the three tasks (Shimojo et al., 
2003) and the almost significant main effect for task, planned contrasts were 
performed comparing the likelihood to gaze at the chosen face/shape in all three tasks. 
As the results in Table 8 show, participants were significantly more likely to gaze at 
the chosen face in the face-gaze-preference task (M = 67.98, SD = 10.82) as compared 
to the face-attractiveness-detection task (M = 64.93, SD = 9.55). In addition, there was 
a marginally significant difference (p = .067) between the face-attractiveness-
detection task (M = 64.93, SD = 9.55) and the shape-gaze-preference task (M = 67.15, 
SD = 9.43). The likelihood to gaze at the chosen face did not differ between the face-
gaze-preference task (M = 67.98, SD = 10.82) and the shape-gaze-preference task (M 
= 67.15, SD = 9.43). 
Table 8 
Planned Contrasts comparing all three Tasks 
Task F(1, 50) p ηp2 
Face-attractiveness-detection vs. Face-gaze-preference 5.60 .022 .101 
Face-attractiveness-detection vs. Shape-gaze-preference 3.51 .067 .066 
Face-gaze-preference vs. Shape-gaze-preference 0.37 .544 .007 
 
These results partially support the effect found by Shimojo et al. (2003) that 
gaze behavior has a stronger influence on decision making when two stimuli are 
similar in attractiveness. 
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Because Gharib et al. (2011) found an increased tendency to gaze at the 
chosen face in individuals with autism at 40 ms before the decision, the data were 
reanalyzed and only the gaze behavior during this time period was used. The 
likelihood to gaze at the chosen face/shape during the last 40 ms before the decision 
was analyzed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA (group × task), with group (HFA vs. Control) 
as a between-subjects factor and task (face-attractiveness-detection task vs. face-gaze-
preference task vs. shape-gaze-preference task) as a within-subjects factor. There was 
a significant main effect for group, F(1, 50) = 4.54, p = .038, ηp2 = .083, indicating 
that individuals with autism were more likely to gaze at the chosen face/stimulus 
during the last 40 ms before the decision than participants in the control group. All 
other effects were not significant, F < 2.03. 
Taken together, the results of the gaze likelihood analysis show that the gaze 
cascade effect could be successfully replicated in both participants in the control 
group and participants with autism. Starting at around 1,000 ms before the decision, 
both groups showed a continuous increase in the likelihood to gaze at the chosen 
face/shape. Additionally, in line with the findings by Shimojo et al. (2003), the gaze 
cascade effect was stronger when the two faces were very similar in attractiveness. 
Also in line with the findings by Shimojo et al. (2003) was the trend that the gaze 
cascade effect was stronger when the two shapes were very similar in attractiveness. 
Supporting the previous findings by Gharib et al. (2011), individuals with autism 
showed an even stronger bias to gaze at the chosen face/shape at 40 ms before the 
decision than control participants. 
Visual attention to regions of interest. To measure participants' visual 
attention to specific parts of the face, each face was divided into four regions of 
interest (ROIs): the eyes, the nose, the mouth, and the rest of the face not covered by 
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the other regions of interest. Regions of interest were only defined for the faces in the 
face-attractiveness-detection task and the face-gaze-preference task. In the shape-
gaze-preference task, no regions of interest could be specified. Because the avatar 
faces differed in size, regions of interest were fitted to each individual face. Figure 19 
shows the regions of interest for one sample face. 
 
Figure 19. Sample face with the four regions of interest used for analyses: the eyes, 
the nose, the mouth, and the rest of the face. 
As the dependent variables, the proportion of fixations (in %) and the total 
duration of fixation time (in ms)—the amount of time participants fixated at the 
different regions of interest in each trial—were calculated for each region of interest. 
Results were calculated separately for the face-attractiveness-detection task and the 
face-gaze-preference-task. Table 9 and Table 10 show the results for the face-
attractiveness-detection task. 
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Table 9 
Mean Proportion of Fixations to ROIs for the Face-attractiveness-detection Task 
  HFA 
(n = 25) 
 Control 
(n = 30) 
        
Region of Interest  M SD  M SD  df  t  p  Cohen's d 
Eyes  24.2 15.5  19.2 15.4  53  1.20  .235  0.32 
Nose  22.3 11.2  25.8 17.0  53  -0.88  .383  -0.24 
Mouth  13.3 12.3  9.7 10.1  53  1.17  .247  0.32 
Face  40.2 10.0  45.3 16.4  53  -1.35  .184  -0.38 
 
Table 10 
Mean Total Duration of Fixation Time (in ms) to ROIs for the Face-attractiveness-
detection Task 
  HFA 
(n = 25) 
 Control 
(n = 30) 
        
Region of Interest  M SD  M SD  df  t  p  Cohen's d 
Eyes  1367 1837  1156 1302  53  0.50  .235  0.13 
Nose  1196 1232  1122 833  53  0.26  .383  0.07 
Mouth  931 1203  571 373  53  1.55  .247  0.40 
Face  1732 1925  1735 1396  53  -0.001  .184  < -0.01 
 
As the results show, visual attention to the different regions of interest did not 
differ significantly between participants diagnosed with autism and participants in the 
control group (see t tests in Table 9 and Table 10). With regard to the proportion of 
fixations, both groups spent the most amount of attention to the face region—the part 
of the face not covered by the other regions of interest—and the least amount of 
attention to the mouth. However, this is not surprising because the face region was 
also the largest of the four regions of interest. The results for the mean total duration 
of fixation time mirror the results for the proportion of fixations, with participants 
fixating the longest on the face area and the shortest on the mouth. 
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Table 11 and Table 12 show the results for the face-gaze-preference task. 
 
Table 11 
Mean Proportion of Fixations to ROIs for the Face-gaze-preference Task 
  HFA 
(n = 24) 
 Control 
(n = 30) 
        
Region of Interest  M SD  M SD  df  t  p  Cohen's d 
Eyes  25.9 17.9  17.8 13.4  52  1.91  .062  0.51 
Nose  20.7 13.7  23.2 10.9  52  -0.76  .449  -0.20 
Mouth  12.9 14.8  11.2 12.1  52  0.45  .652  0.13 
Face  40.6 13.6  47.8 15.3  52  -1.81  .077  -0.50 
 
Table 12 
Mean Total Duration of Fixation Time (in ms) to ROIs for the Face-gaze-preference 
Task 
  HFA 
(n = 24) 
 Control 
(n = 30) 
        
Region of Interest  M SD  M SD  df  t  p  Cohen's d 
Eyes  1558 2171  1375 2174  52  0.31  .760  0.08 
Nose  1132 867  1219 986  52  -0.34  .738  -0.09 
Mouth  785 949  583 405  52  1.05  .298  0.28 
Face  1681 1554  2075 1529  52  -0.94  .354  -0.26 
 
The results for the face-gaze-preference task were similar to the results for the 
face-attractiveness-detection task. Overall, visual attention to the different regions of 
interest did not differ significantly between participants diagnosed with autism and 
participants in the control group (see t tests in Table 11 and Table 12). This was true 
for both the proportion of fixations and the total duration of fixation time. Again, 
most of the attention was focused on the face region as opposed to the mouth. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   112 
Because Swanson and Siller (2013) did find a difference in the duration of the 
first fixation to the eyes, with individuals with autism making shorter first fixations to 
the eyes, I also compared the duration of the first fixation to the eyes between both 
groups. There was no significant difference between individuals diagnosed with 
autism (M = 208 ms, SD = 52 ms) and participants in the control group (M = 219 ms, 
SD = 53 ms) in the face-attractiveness-detection task, t(52) = -0.47, p = .474, d = -
0.19. There was also no significant difference between the HFA group (M = 221 ms, 
SD = 70 ms) and the control group (M = 210 ms, SD = 55 ms) in the face-gaze-
preference task, t(51) = 0.68, p = .500, d = 0.18. 
To sum up, the analysis of participants' visual attention to the different regions 
of the faces revealed no differences between participants diagnosed with autism and 




The main goal of this study was to investigate whether adults diagnosed with 
high-functioning autism are impaired in their ability to detect attractiveness. 
Furthermore, the present study investigated whether the gaze cascade effect (Shimojo 
et al., 2003) could be replicated in individuals with autism. 
As the behavioral results show, individuals with high-functioning autism are 
impaired in their ability to detect attractiveness. When presented with two faces—one 
attractive, one unattractive—individuals with autism chose the attractive face less 
often than participants in the control group. In line with these results, individuals with 
autism also rated the task to be more difficult than participants in the control group. 
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With regard to reaction times, there was no difference between individuals with 
autism and participants in the control group.  
These results differ from a previous study by da Fonseca et al. (2011) who 
found that children with autism did not differ in their ratings of attractive faces from 
typically developing children. In a different study, White et al. (2006) found impaired 
performance of individuals with autism in the detection of attractiveness in faces of 
the own gender. Compared to White et al. (2006), the results from the present study 
support the notion that the ability to detect attractiveness in faces might be generally 
impaired in individuals with autism and not limited to faces of the own gender. The 
difference in results between the study by White et al. (2006) and the present study 
can in part be explained by the small sample size of the study by White et al. (2006) 
(HFA: 10 male, 6 female; Control: 12 male, 10 female), which had probably too little 
statistical power to detect a general deficit. 
In order to investigate if the impairment in the detection of attractiveness 
could be due to autistic participants focusing on other parts of the face than typically 
developing participants and therefore missing parts of the face that might be crucial in 
judging attractiveness, the present study analyzed the visual attention directed at 
different parts of the face. The results from the present study show no differences 
between participants with autism and participants in the control group, and are 
therefore in line with previous studies that have also found no differences (e.g., 
McPartland et al., 2011; Georgescu et al., 2013; Rutherford & Towns, 2008). The 
highest amount of attention was focused on the face region—without the other 
regions of interest—followed by the eyes and the nose; the least amount of attention 
was focused on the mouth. This distribution of attention was an adaptive strategy with 
regard to the task that participants had to perform—namely, to choose the more 
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attractive face—because the face area contained the most information to make that 
decision. Because several other studies have found a tendency in individuals with 
autism to avoid the gaze of faces (e.g., Jones et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2005), the 
present study also used a micromeasure proposed by Swanson and Siller (2013)—
duration of the first fixation to the eyes—to test if individuals with autism fixate less 
at the eyes. However, contrary to Swanson and Siller (2013), individuals diagnosed 
with autism did fixate at the eyes during the first fixation as long as participants in the 
control group. Thus, the results of the present study do not support the idea that 
individuals with autism avert their gaze to avoid looking at the eyes of other persons. 
Even though gaze aversion is considered to be one of the prominent signs auf autism 
and has been documented in several studies (e.g., Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 
2007; Jones et al., 2008; Richer & Coss, 1976; Hutt & Ounsted, 1966), there are also 
studies that have failed to show gaze aversion in social interactions (e.g., Doherty-
Sneddon, Whittle, & Riby, 2012; García-Pérez, Lee, & Hobson, 2007). One possible 
explanation for these diverging results may be the different levels of functioning of 
the participants with autism in these studies. The participants in the present study 
were adults with high-functioning autism and may therefore have developed 
compensatory strategies for social interactions. However, the duration of the first 
fixation to the eyes is a measure that lies out of conscious control und may rather 
represent an automatic orientation. Taking this into account, the results rather support 
the idea that high-functioning individuals with autism automatically fixate the eyes as 
typically developing individuals. 
In sum, the results show that the impaired performance of individuals with 
autism in detecting attractiveness cannot be explained by a different distribution of 
attention to parts of the face because individuals with autism did not differ from 
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participants in the control group. Because the gaze behavior does not reveal a possible 
explanation for the impairment, other methodologies should be used to test alternative 
explanations. For instance, future fMRI-studies could investigate the different neural 
responses to attractive and unattractive faces in individuals with autism. Previous 
fMRI-studies have shown that attractive faces activate reward centers in the brain, 
such as the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Aharon et 
al., 2001; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Cloutier et al., 2008; Liang et al., 2010; Winston et 
al., 2007). It should therefore be investigated if individuals with autism show a similar 
response to attractive faces in these areas. In a first study in this direction, Dichter et 
al. (2012) could show that faces produced an altered response in the reward circuitry 
in individuals with autism as compared to typically developing individuals, hinting at 
a possible explanation for the impairment in the perception of attractiveness that 
should be explored in future studies. 
Another possible explanation for autistic participants' impaired performance in 
the perception of attractiveness may be that individuals with autism do not have 
access to the same standards typically developing individuals use for judging 
attractiveness. Several studies have shown that the averageness of faces has a strong 
influence on the perception of attractiveness—average faces are judged to be more 
attractive (e.g., Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Because individuals with autism may 
have less exposure to faces than typically developing individuals, it may be harder for 
them to judge the averageness of faces. 
With regard to the relation between participants gaze behavior and their 
decisions, the present study successfully replicated the gaze cascade effect in 
individuals with autism. At around 1,000 ms both groups showed a continuous 
increase in the likelihood to gaze at the chosen face/shape. Additionally, in line with 
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the findings by Shimojo et al. (2003) the gaze cascade effect was stronger when the 
two faces were very similar in attractiveness. Also in line with the findings by 
Shimojo et al. (2003) was the trend that the gaze cascade effect was also stronger 
when the two shapes were very similar in attractiveness. When analyzing the last 
1,000 ms before the decision—about the time period when the likelihood to gaze at 
the chosen face starts to rise above 50%—individuals with autism did not differ in 
their likelihood to gaze at the chosen from participants in the control group. Only 
when analyzing the last 40 ms before the decision, such as Gharib et al. (2011) did in 
their study, did I find an increased likelihood in individuals with autism to gaze at the 
chosen face/shape compared to typically developing individuals. This difference 
during such a short time period before the decision is difficult to interpret. Gharib et 
al. (2011) did not give a theory-driven explanation in their study for selecting this 
time period for analysis.  
Interestingly, participants with autism did show a gaze bias toward both faces 
and abstract shapes. Even though some studies have shown that facial stimuli may be 
aversive (e.g., Corden et al., 2008) for individuals with autism, this did not influence 
the gaze bias towards them.  
The results of the present study may also be conceptually in contrast to a study 
by Grynszpan et al. (2012) that found impaired self-monitoring of gaze in individuals 
with autism. Because the gaze cascade effect relies on a proposed connection between 
gaze behavior and decision making, the successful replication of the gaze cascade 
effect in individuals with autism may hint at the fact that gaze behavior may also feed 
into decision processes in individuals with autism. However, future studies are needed 
to further entangle the relation between self-monitoring of gaze and decision making 
in autism. Overall, the results hint at the possibility that mere exposure (Zajonc, 2001) 
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and preferential looking (Birch et al., 1985) might work in a similar way together in 
individuals with autism to produce an increasing gaze bias towards the chosen 
face/shape. It is important to note, however, that it is not possible to draw this 
conclusion solely based on the results of this study because it did not include an active 
manipulation of participants' gaze. A further study with an active gaze manipulation is 
needed to show that the gaze behavior itself did influence participants' decisions. Still, 
the results of the gaze likelihood analysis show that gaze and decision-making are 
related in a similar way in individuals with autism as in typically developing 
individuals. 
There are some limitations to the present study that should be considered: 
First, the present study only included a small number of female participants (HFA: 20 
male, 10 female; Control: 20 male, 10 female). It should therefore be further 
investigated if the perception of attractiveness does differ between males and females 
in autism. Interestingly, the present study did find a significant main effect of 
participants' gender on the perception of attractiveness, with males generally 
performing better than females. This was true in both the HFA group and the control 
group. On the whole, female participants with autism performed worst on the 
attractiveness detection task. In light of the background of theories proposing that 
symptom severity in autism is stronger in autistic females than in autistic males 
(Holtmann, Bölte, & Poustka, 2007; Crespi & Badcock, 2008), this trend should be 
further investigated in future studies with more female autistic participants. 
Second, even though participants' position in front of the monitor was 
standardized, gaze data from five participants diagnosed with autism had to be 
excluded because they had more than 20% of missing data and fixations could not be 
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reliably calculated. Therefore, a future replication of the study should include a larger 
sample of individuals with autism to account for possible tracking problems. 
To conclude, the present study aimed at investigating whether individuals with 
autism are impaired in their ability to detect attractiveness. Taking into account 
participants' gaze behavior, the study further investigated whether this impairment 
may be explained by different patterns of visual attention to parts of the face in 
individuals with autism. Additionally, the study investigated whether an orienting bias 
towards the chosen face—the gaze cascade effect (Shimojo et al., 2003)—could be 
replicated in individuals with autism. The results suggest that individuals with autism 
are impaired in their ability to distinguish between attractive and unattractive faces. 
However, patterns of visual attention did not differ between individuals with autism 
and participants in the control group. Finally, the gaze cascade effect could be 
successfully replicated in individuals with autism. Thus, even though individuals with 
autism were impaired in their ability to detect attractiveness, gaze behavior was 
comparable to typical adults. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of the four studies in this thesis was to advance knowledge in two 
major fields of social cognition—cross-cultural psychology and high-functioning 
autism—by using virtual avatars:  
Study 1 assessed the validity of avatars by investigating whether people trust 
avatars in a similar way as they trust photographs in an e-commerce setting. Both 
positive reputation and trustworthy avatars led to higher purchase rates than negative 
reputation and untrustworthy avatars. However, participants' responses to seller 
avatars were influenced by the uncertainty inherent in the reputation scores. When the 
uncertainty that the seller would ship the product was high, participants were more 
susceptible to the influence of the seller avatars. As the results show, there are subtle 
differences in the effects of virtual avatars as opposed to photographs. 
Study 2 focused on cross-cultural differences in trust and investigated whether 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures differ in their use of two different sources of 
information—factual information and tacit cues—in building trust. As the results of 
the trust game show, participants from Germany, a more individualistic culture, and 
the United Arab Emirates, a more collectivistic culture, were influenced by both 
reputation scores and seller avatars. However, both cultures did differ in the effect of 
reputation on purchase decisions. German participants bought significantly less often 
than Arab participants when the reputation of the seller was low, hinting at a possible 
higher susceptibility to low reputation of members of individualistic cultures.  
Study 3 focused on the question whether adults diagnosed with HFA are 
impaired in their ability to detect direct gaze. In addition, it was also tested whether 
these gaze processing impairments could—at least in part—be due to the 
uncontrollability of the social stimuli by giving participants control over the gaze of a 
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realistic virtual character. As the results show, adult individuals with high-functioning 
autism are impaired in their ability to distinguish between direct and averted gaze. 
Results of the setting task with the virtual character show that individuals with autism 
are in fact able to establish direct gaze accurately when they have full control over a 
social stimulus, hinting at a possible training mechanism that may help individuals 
with autism to improve at the detection of direct gaze. 
Study 4 investigated whether adults diagnosed with high-functioning autism 
are impaired in their ability to detect attractiveness. Also, by monitoring participants' 
gaze while they made their decisions, it was tested whether atypical patterns of visual 
attention can in part explain a possible deficit. As the behavioral results show, 
individuals with high-functioning autism are impaired in their ability to detect 
attractiveness. However, gaze behavior was comparable to typical adults. 
Limitations 
It is important to consider that each of the four studies has its own specific 
limitations: 
Study 1 did use only photorealistic avatars. The results with regard to the trust 
building effect of avatars can therefore not easily be generalized to other forms of 
avatars that are less realistic. Besides, participants in the study were informed that the 
avatars were created on the basis of photographs from real humans. This knowledge 
about the origins of the avatars may have further increased their trustworthiness. 
Therefore, other studies using avatars should be careful at assuming a general effect 
of avatars on producing behavioral trust. 
Study 2 investigated only two very specific cultures: Germany and the United 
Arab Emirates. Even though both cultures differ on the individualism/collectivism 
dimension (Hofstede et al., 2010), there are also numerous other differences between 
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the two cultures that could potentially account for the differences found in the study. 
For instance, both cultures also differ with regard to power distance. 
Study 3 only focused on adults with high-functioning autism and therefore 
does not allow for a developmental perspective on autistic deficits in gaze detection. 
Additionally, the non-social, geometric stimulus was less visually complex than the 
social stimulus. Therefore, it is possible that a more complex non-social, geometric 
stimulus may have uncovered a general deficit in the processing of moving stimuli by 
individuals with autism. 
Study 4 included only a small number of female participants in both the HFA 
and the control group. The results did show a tendency that female participants with 
high-functioning autism were particularly impaired in the perception of attractiveness. 
However, this should be replicated in a larger sample of females. 
Future Research Directions 
A future replication of Study 1 should investigate if avatars that are not 
photorealistic can elicit similar levels of behavioral trust. Moreover, it should be 
further investigated if the knowledge that the avatars were based on real individuals 
did increase their trustworthiness. 
Study 2 should be replicated with a larger group of different individualistic 
and collectivistic cultures. Special attention should hereby be given to the other 
cultural dimensions and their potential influence on the likelihood to trust. 
Because Study 3 has shown that individuals with autism can in part overcome 
their deficit in the detection of direct gaze if given active control over the gaze of the 
avatar, it should be investigated if a training program utilizing active gaze control can 
produce a lasting improvement in direct gaze detection in autism. Additionally, it 
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should be tested if such improvements in direct gaze detection may generalize to 
improvements in other areas of social interaction. 
Even though Study 4 did find an impairment in the perception of 
attractiveness in individuals with autism, eye-tracking results did not reveal cues to an 
underlying mechanism that may account for the impairment. Based on the finding that 
faces (Dichter et al., 2012) produced an altered response in the reward circuitry in 
individuals with autism, future fMRI-studies may help to investigate the underlying 
differences in the neural responses to attractive faces. 
Conclusion 
In sum, this thesis investigated how the unique advantages of avatars can help 
uncover new findings in social cognition: Avatars can produce similar behavioral 
responses as real humans, as shown by the willingness to trust avatars in a similar 
way as other humans. Individualistic and collectivistic cultures are similar in their 
tendency to rely both on factual information and tacit, social cues. However, negative 
factual information may have special salience in individualistic cultures. With regard 
to psychopathology, individuals with autism may be impaired in two basic areas of 
social perception—the detection of direct gaze and the perception of attractiveness. 
However, with the help of interactive paradigms individuals with autism may learn to 







Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   123 
Bibliography 
Adams, R. B. & Kleck, R. E. (2005). Effects of direct and averted gaze on the 
perception of facially communicated emotion. Emotion, 5(1), 3-11. 
doi:10.1037/1528-3542.5.1.3 
Aharon, I., Etcoff, N., Ariely, D., Chabris, C. F., O'Connor, E., & Breiter, H. C. 
(2001). Beautiful faces have variable reward value: FMRI and behavioral 
evidence. Neuron, 32(3), 537-551. 
Akechi, H., Senju, A., Kikuchi, Y., Tojo, Y., Osanai, H., & Hasegawa, T. (2010). The 
effect of gaze direction on the processing of facial expressions in children with 
autism spectrum disorder: An ERP study. Neuropsychologia, 48(10), 2841-
2851. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.026 
Ashwin, E., Ashwin, C., Rhydderch, D., Howells, J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2009). 
Eagle-eyed visual acuity: An experimental investigation of enhanced 
perception in autism. Biological Psychiatry, 65(1), 17-21. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.06.012 
Ayres, I., Banaji, M., & Jolls, C. (2011). Race effects on ebay. The Selected Works of 
Ian Ayres. Retrieved from http://works.bepress.com/ian_ayres/23 
Ballew, C. C. & Todorov, A. (2007). Predicting political elections from rapid and 
unreflective face judgments. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 104(46), 17948-17953. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1988). Social and pragmatic deficits in autism: Cognitive or 
affective?. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 18(3), 379-402. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2009). Autism: The empathizing-systemizing (ES) theory. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1156(1), The Year in Cognitive 
Neuroscience 2009), 68-80. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04467.x 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   124 
Baron-Cohen, S. & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The empathy quotient: An investigation 
of adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex 
differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34(2), 163-75. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Ashwin, E., Ashwin, C., Tavassoli, T., & Chakrabarti, B. (2009). 
Talent in autism: Hyper-systemizing, hyper-attention to detail and sensory 
hypersensitivity. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 
Series B, Biological Sciences, 364(1522), 1377-1383. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0337 
Baron-Cohen, S., Hoekstra, R. A., Knickmeyer, R., & Wheelwright, S. (2006). The 
autism-spectrum quotient (AQ)--adolescent version. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 36(3), 343-50. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0073-6 
Baron-Cohen, S., Richler, J., Bisarya, D., Gurunathan, N., & Wheelwright, S. (2003). 
The systemizing quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger syndrome 
or high-functioning autism, and normal sex differences. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 
358(1430), 361-374. doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1206 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The 
"reading the mind in the eyes" test revised version: A study with normal 
adults, and adults with asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal 
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, 42(2), 241-251. 
Beck, A. T. & Steer, R. A. (1987). Beck depression inventory - manual. San Antonio: 
The Psychological Association. 
Bente, G., Baptist, O., & Leuschner, H. (2012). To buy or not to buy: Influence of 
seller photos and reputation on buyer trust and purchase behavior. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   125 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 70(1), 1-13. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2011.08.005 
Bente, G., Donaghy, W. C., & Suwelack, D. (1998). Sex differences in body 
movement and visual attention: An integrated analysis of movement and gaze 
in mixed-sex dyads. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 22(1), 31-58. 
Bente, G., Eschenburg, F., & Krämer, N. (2007). Virtual gaze. A pilot study on the 
effects of computer simulated gaze in avatar-based conversations. Virtual 
Reality, HCI 2007, 185-194. 
Bente, G., Krämer, N. C., Petersen, A., & de Ruiter, J. P. (2001). Computer animated 
movement and person perception: Methodological advances in nonverbal 
behavior research. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 25(3), 151-166. 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142. 
Beugelsdijk, S., De Groot, H. L., & Van Schaik, A. B. (2004). Trust and economic 
growth: A robustness analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(1), 118-134. 
Birch, E. E., Shimojo, S., & Held, R. (1985). Preferential-looking assessment of 
fusion and stereopsis in infants aged 1-6 months. Investigative Ophthalmology 
& Visual Science, 26(3), 366-370. 
Bohnet, I., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2010). Trust and the reference points for 
trustworthiness in gulf and western countries. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 125(2), 811-828. 
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2004). Trust among internet traders: A 
behavioral economics approach. Analyse Und Kritik, 26(1), 185-202. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   126 
Branzei, O., Vertinsky, I., & Camp, R. D. (2007). Culture-contingent signs of trust in 
emergent relationships. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 104(1), 61-82. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.11.002 
Chua, H. F., Boland, J. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (2005). Cultural variation in eye 
movements during scene perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 102(35), 12629-33. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0506162102 
Cloutier, J., Heatherton, T. F., Whalen, P. J., & Kelley, W. M. (2008). Are attractive 
people rewarding? Sex differences in the neural substrates of facial 
attractiveness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(6), 941-951. 
Corden, B., Chilvers, R., & Skuse, D. (2008). Avoidance of emotionally arousing 
stimuli predicts social-perceptual impairment in Asperger's syndrome. 
Neuropsychologia, 46(1), 137-47. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.08.005 
Crespi, B. & Badcock, C. (2008). Psychosis and autism as diametrical disorders of the 
social brain. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31(3), 241-61; discussion 
261-320. doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004214 
Da Fonseca, D., Santos, A., Rosset, D., & Deruelle, C. (2011). The “beauty is good” 
for children with autism spectrum disorders too. Research in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, 5(1), 299-304. doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2010.04.012 
Dakhli, M. (2009). Investigating the effects of individualism-collectivism on trust and 
cooperation. Psychology Journal, 6(3), 90-99. 
Dalton, K. M., Nacewicz, B. M., Johnstone, T., Schaefer, H. S., Gernsbacher, M. A., 
Goldsmith, H. H., et al. (2005). Gaze fixation and the neural circuitry of face 
processing in autism. Nature Neuroscience, 8(4), 519-26. doi:10.1038/nn1421 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   127 
Dawson, G., Meltzoff, A. N., Osterling, J., Rinaldi, J., & Brown, E. (1998). Children 
with autism fail to orient to naturally occurring social stimuli. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 28(6), 479-85. 
Dawson, G., Webb, S. J., & McPartland, J. (2005). Understanding the nature of face 
processing impairment in autism: Insights from behavioral and 
electrophysiological studies. Developmental Neuropsychology, 27(3), 403-24. 
doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2703_6 
Dichter, G. S. & Belger, A. (2007). Social stimuli interfere with cognitive control in 
autism. NeuroImage, 35(3), 1219-30. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.12.038 
Dichter, G. S., Richey, J. A., Rittenberg, A. M., Sabatino, A., & Bodfish, J. W. 
(2012). Reward circuitry function in autism during face anticipation and 
outcomes. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 42(2), 147-60. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-011-1221-1 
Diekmann, A., Jann, B., & Wyder, D. (2007). Trust and reputation in internet 
auctions. In K. S. Cook, C. Snijders, V. Buskens, & C. Cheshire (Eds.), 
ETrust. Forming relationships in the online world. (pp. 139-65). New York, 
NY: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Doherty-Sneddon, G., Whittle, L., & Riby, D. M. (2012). Gaze aversion during social 
style interactions in autism spectrum disorder and williams syndrome. 
Research in Developmental Disabilities, 34(1), 616-626. 
doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2012.09.022 
Doleac, J. L. & Stein, L. C. (2010). The visible hand: Race and online market 
outcomes. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1615149 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   128 
Eagly, A. H., Ashmore, R. D., Makhijani, M. G., & Longo, L. C. (1991). What is 
beautiful is good, but…: A meta-analytic review of research on the physical 
attractiveness stereotype. Psychological Bulletin, 110(1), 109-128. 
Elsabbagh, M., Volein, A., Csibra, G., Holmboe, K., Garwood, H., Tucker, L., et al. 
(2009). Neural correlates of eye gaze processing in the infant broader autism 
phenotype. Biological Psychiatry, 65(1), 31-8. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.09.034 
FaceGen. (2012). Singular Inversions Inc. 
Faja, S., Aylward, E., Bernier, R., & Dawson, G. (2008). Becoming a face expert: A 
computerized face-training program for high-functioning individuals with 
autism spectrum disorders. Developmental Neuropsychology, 33(1), 1-24. 
doi:10.1080/87565640701729573 
Falck-Ytter, T. & von Hofsten, C. (2011). How special is social looking in ASD: A 
review. Progress in Brain Research, 189, 209. 
Falkmer, T., Dahlman, J., Dukic, T., Bjällmark, A., & Larsson, M. (2008). Fixation 
identification in centroid versus start-point modes using eye-tracking data. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 106(3), 710-724. 
Farroni, T., Csibra, G., Simion, F., & Johnson, M. H. (2002). Eye contact detection in 
humans from birth. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 99(14), 9602-9605. doi:10.1073/pnas.152159999 
Ferrara, C. & Hill, S. D. (1980). The responsiveness of autistic children to the 
predictability of social and nonsocial toys. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 10(1), 51-57. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   129 
Flannery, K. & Horner, R. H. (1994). The relationship between predictability and 
problem behavior for students with severe disabilities. Journal of Behavioral 
Education, 4(2), 157-176. 
Frith, U. & de Vignemont, F. (2005). Egocentrism, allocentrism, and Asperger 
syndrome. Consciousness and Cognition, 14(4), 719-38. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.006 
Gamer, M. & Hecht, H. (2007). Are you looking at me? Measuring the cone of gaze. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 
33(3), 705-715. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.33.3.705 
García-Pérez, R. M., Lee, A., & Hobson, R. P. (2007). On intersubjective engagement 
in autism: A controlled study of nonverbal aspects of conversation. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(7), 1310-22. doi:10.1007/s10803-
006-0276-x 
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B., & Thöni, C. (2010). Culture and cooperation. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 365(1553), 2651-61. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0135 
Georgescu, A. L., Kuzmanovic, B., Santos, N. S., Tepest, R., Bente, G., Tittgemeyer, 
M., et al. (2013). Perceiving nonverbal behavior: Neural correlates of 
processing movement fluency and contingency in dyadic interactions. Human 
Brain Mapping. doi:10.1002/hbm.22259 
Gepner, B., de Gelder, B., & de Schonen, S. (1996). Face processing in autistics: 
Evidence for a generalised deficit?. Child Neuropsychology, 2(2), 123-139. 
Gepner, B., Deruelle, C., & Grynfeltt, S. (2001). Motion and emotion: A novel 
approach to the study of face processing by young autistic children. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31(1), 37-45. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   130 
Gharib, A., Mier, D., Adolphs, R., & Shimojo, S. (2011). Gaze and preference 
decision making in autism. Journal of Vision, 11(11). 
Gheorghiu, M. A., Vignoles, V. L., & Smith, P. B. (2009). Beyond the united states 
and japan: Testing yamagishi's emancipation theory of trust across 31 nations. 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 72(4), 365-383. 
Gielis, J. (2003). A generic geometric transformation that unifies a wide range of 
natural and abstract shapes. American Journal of Botany, 90(3), 333-338. 
Glaholt, M. G. & Reingold, E. M. (2009). Stimulus exposure and gaze bias: A further 
test of the gaze cascade model. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 71(3), 
445-50. doi:10.3758/APP.71.3.445 
Glaholt, M. G. & Reingold, E. M. (2011). Eye movement monitoring as a process 
tracing methodology in decision making research. Journal of Neuroscience, 
Psychology, and Economics, 4(2), 125-146. doi:10.1037/a0020692 
Golan, O., Ashwin, E., Granader, Y., McClintock, S., Day, K., Leggett, V., et al. 
(2009). Enhancing emotion recognition in children with autism spectrum 
conditions: An intervention using animated vehicles with real emotional faces. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40, 269-279. Retrieved 
October 10, 2009, from 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/y4164n56855305p0/ 
doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0862-9 
Gomot, M. & Wicker, B. (2011). A challenging, unpredictable world for people with 
autism spectrum disorder. International Journal of Psychophysiology. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.09.017 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   131 
Grammer, K. & Thornhill, R. (1994). Human (homo sapiens) facial attractiveness and 
sexual selection: The role of symmetry and averageness. Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 108(3), 233-242. 
Gregg, D. G. & Scott, J. E. (2006). The role of reputation systems in reducing on-line 
auction fraud. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 10(3), 95-120. 
Grice, S. J., Halit, H., Farroni, T., Baron-Cohen, S., Bolton, P., & Johnson, M. H. 
(2005). Neural correlates of eye-gaze detection in young children with autism. 
Cortex, 41(3), 342-53. 
Grynszpan, O., Nadel, J., Martin, J. C., Simonin, J., Bailleul, P., Wang, Y., et al. 
(2012). Self-Monitoring of gaze in high functioning autism. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 42(8), 1642-1650. 
Hautzinger, M. (1995). Beck-Depressions-Inventar (BDI). Bern: Huber. 
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across 
societies. Science (New York, N.Y.), 319(5868), 1362-7. 
doi:10.1126/science.1153808 
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organisations: 
Software of the mind. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Holtmann, M., Bölte, S., & Poustka, F. (2007). Autism spectrum disorders: Sex 
differences in autistic behaviour domains and coexisting psychopathology. 
Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology, 49(5), 361-366. 
Howard, M. A., Cowell, P. E., Boucher, J., Broks, P., Mayes, A., Farrant, A., et al. 
(2000). Convergent neuroanatomical and behavioural evidence of an 
amygdala hypothesis of autism. Neuroreport, 11(13), 2931-35. 
Hudson, J. (2006). Institutional trust and subjective well-being across the EU. Kyklos, 
59(1), 43-62. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   132 
Huff, L. & Kelley, L. (2003). Levels of organizational trust in individualist versus 
collectivist societies: A seven-nation study. Organization Science, 14(1), 81-
90. 
Hutt, C. & Ounsted, C. (1966). The biological significance of gaze aversion with 
particular reference to the syndrome of infantile autism. Behavioral Science, 
11(5), 346-356. 
Jamal, A. (2007). When is social trust a desirable outcome?: Examining levels of trust 
in the Arab world. Comparative Political Studies, 40(11), 1328-1349. 
doi:10.1177/001041400629183 
Jemel, B., Mottron, L., & Dawson, M. (2006). Impaired face processing in autism: 
Fact or artifact?. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36(1), 91-
106. doi:10.1007/s10803-005-0050-5 
Jones, E., Moore, J. N., Stanaland, A. J., & Wyatt, R. A. (1998). Salesperson race and 
gender and the access and legitimacy paradigm: Does difference make a 
difference?. The Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, 71-88. 
Jones, W., Carr, K., & Klin, A. (2008). Absence of preferential looking to the eyes of 
approaching adults predicts level of social disability in 2-year-old toddlers 
with autism spectrum disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 65(8), 946. 
Joseph, R. M., Ehrman, K., McNally, R., & Keehn, B. (2008). Affective response to 
eye contact and face recognition ability in children with ASD. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 14(06), 947-955. 
doi:10.10170S1355617708081344 
Klin, A., Lin, D. J., Gorrindo, P., Ramsay, G., & Jones, W. (2009). Two-year-olds 
with autism orient to non-social contingencies rather than biological motion. 
Nature, 459(7244), 257-61. doi:10.1038/nature07868 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   133 
Knight, J. (2001). Social norms and the rule of law: Fostering trust in a socially 
diverse society. In K. Cook (Ed.), Trust in society. (pp. 354-73). New York, 
NY: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Kuzmanovic, B., Georgescu, A. L., Eickhoff, S. B., Shah, N. J., Bente, G., Fink, G. 
R., et al. (2009). Duration matters: Dissociating neural correlates of detection 
and evaluation of social gaze. NeuroImage, 46(4), 1154-63. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.03.037 
Kylliäinen, A. & Hietanen, J. K. (2006). Skin conductance responses to another 
person's gaze in children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 36(4), 517-25. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0091-4 
Langlois, J. H. & Roggman, L. A. (1990). Attractive faces are only average. 
Psychological Science, 1(2), 115-121. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1990.tb00079.x 
Langlois, J. H., Kalakanis, L., Rubenstein, A. J., Larson, A., Hallam, M., & Smoot, 
M. (2000). Maxims or myths of beauty? A meta-analytic and theoretical 
review. Psychological Bulletin, 126(3), 390-423. 
Langlois, J. H., Roggman, L. A., Casey, R. J., Ritter, J. M., Rieser-Danner, L. A., & 
Jenkins, V. Y. (1987). Infant preferences for attractive faces: Rudiments of a 
stereotype?. Developmental Psychology, 23(3), 363-369. 
Lee, F., Hallahan, M., & Herzog, T. (1996). Explaining real-life events: How culture 
and domain shape attributions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
22(7), 732-741. doi:10.1177/0146167296227007 
Lehnhardt, F. G., Gawronski, A., Volpert, K., Schilbach, L., Tepest, R., Huff, W., et 
al. (2011). Autismus-Spektrum-Sto rungen im Erwachsenenalter: Klinische 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   134 
und neuropsychologische Befunde spa tdiagnostizierter Asperger-Syndrome. 
Fortschritte Der Neurologie Und Psychiatrie, 79, 290-297. 
Liang, X., Zebrowitz, L. A., & Zhang, Y. (2010). Neural activation in the “reward 
circuit” shows a nonlinear response to facial attractiveness. Social 
Neuroscience, 5(3), 320-334. 
Loth, E., Happé, F., & Gómez, J. C. (2010). Variety is not the spice of life for people 
with autism spectrum disorders: Frequency ratings of central, variable and 
inappropriate aspects of common real-life events. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 40(6), 730-42. doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0929-7 
Louwerse, A., van der Geest, N., Tulen, H. M., van der Ende, J., Van Gool, R., 
Verhulst, C., et al. (2013). Effects of eye gaze directions of facial images on 
looking behaviour and autonomic responses in adolescents with autism 
spectrum disorders. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 7(9), 1043-1053. 
doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2013.04.013 
Maner, J. K., Kenrick, D. T., Becker, D. V., Delton, A. W., Hofer, B., Wilbur, C. J., et 
al. (2003). Sexually selective cognition: Beauty captures the mind of the 
beholder. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(6), 1107-20. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.6.1107 
Manor, B. R. & Gordon, E. (2003). Defining the temporal threshold for ocular 
fixation in free-viewing visuocognitive tasks. Journal of Neuroscience 
Methods, 128(1-2), 85-93. doi:10.1016/S0165-0270(03)00151-1 
Markus, H. R. & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for 
cognition, motivation, and emotion. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253. 
Martin, W. & Rovira, M. (1982). Response biases in eye-gaze perception. Journal of 
Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 110(2), 203-209. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   135 
McPartland, J. C., Webb, S. J., Keehn, B., & Dawson, G. (2011). Patterns of visual 
attention to faces and objects in autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 41(2), 148-57. doi:10.1007/s10803-010-1033-8 
Moser, E., Derntl, B., Robinson, S., Fink, B., Gur, R. C., & Grammer, K. (2007). 
Amygdala activation at 3T in response to human and avatar facial expressions 
of emotions. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 161(1), 126-33. 
doi:10.1016/j.jneumeth.2006.10.016 
Myowa-Yamakoshi, M., Tomonaga, M., Tanaka, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2003). 
Preference for human direct gaze in infant chimpanzees (pan troglodytes). 
Cognition, 89(2), 53-64. 
Nation, K. & Penny, S. (2008). Sensitivity to eye gaze in autism: Is it normal? Is it 
automatic? Is it social?. Development and Psychopathology, 20(1), 79-97. 
doi:10.1017/S0954579408000047 
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of 
thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 
291-310. 
Nittono, H. & Wada, Y. (2009). Gaze shifts do not affect preference judgements of 
graphic patterns. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 109, 79-94. 
O'Doherty, J., Winston, J., Critchley, H., Perrett, D., Burt, D. M., & Dolan, R. J. 
(2003). Beauty in a smile: The role of medial orbitofrontal cortex in facial 
attractiveness. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 147-155. 
Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. 
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. (pp. 123-
205). New York: Academic Press. 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   136 
Pitskel, N. B., Bolling, D. Z., Hudac, C. M., Lantz, S. D., Minshew, N. J., Vander 
Wyk, B. C., et al. (2011). Brain mechanisms for processing direct and averted 
gaze in individuals with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders. doi:10.1007/s10803-011-1197-x 
Qian, N. & Lipkin, R. M. (2011). A learning-style theory for understanding autistic 
behaviors. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5, 1-17. 
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00077 
Richer, J. M. & Coss, R. G. (1976). Gaze aversion in autistic and normal children. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 53(3), 193-210. 
Riedl, R., Mohr, P., Kenning, P., Davis, F. D., & Heekeren, H. (2011). Trusting 
humans and avatars: Behavioral and neural evidence. In Proceedings of the 
32nd international conference on information systems (ICIS). 
Ristic, J., Mottron, L., Friesen, C. K., Iarocci, G., Burack, J. A., & Kingstone, A. 
(2005). Eyes are special but not for everyone: The case of autism. Brain 
Research. Cognitive Brain Research, 24(3), 715-718. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.02.007 
Rutherford, M. D. & Towns, A. M. (2008). Scan path differences and similarities 
during emotion perception in those with and without autism spectrum 
disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(7), 1371-81. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-007-0525-7 
Sanefuji, W. & Ohgami, H. (2011). Imitative behaviors facilitate communicative gaze 
in children with autism. Infant Mental Health Journal, 32(1), 134-142. 
doi:10.1002/imhj.20287 
Schilbach, L., Eickhoff, S. B., Cieslik, E. C., Kuzmanovic, B., & Vogeley, K. (2012). 
Shall we do this together? Social gaze influences action control in a 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   137 
comparison group, but not in individuals with high-functioning autism. 
Autism, 16(2), 151-162. doi:10.1177/1362361311409258 
Senju, A. & Johnson, M. H. (2009). The eye contact effect: Mechanisms and 
development. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(3), 127-34. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.11.009 
Senju, A., Hasegawa, T., & Tojo, Y. (2005). Does perceived direct gaze boost 
detection in adults and children with and without autism? The stare-in-the-
crowd effect revisited. Visual Cognition, 12(8), 1474-1496. 
doi:10.1080/13506280444000797 
Senju, A., Kikuchi, Y., Hasegawa, T., Tojo, Y., & Osanai, H. (2008). Is anyone 
looking at me? Direct gaze detection in children with and without autism. 
Brain and Cognition, 67(2), 127-139. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2007.12.001 
Senju, A., Yaguchi, K., Tojo, Y., & Hasegawa, T. (2003). Eye contact does not 
facilitate detection in children with autism. Cognition, 89(1), 43-51. 
Shimojo, S., Simion, C., Shimojo, E., & Scheier, C. (2003). Gaze bias both reflects 
and influences preference. Nature Neuroscience, 6(12), 1317-22. 
doi:10.1038/nn1150 
Simion, C. & Shimojo, S. (2007). Interrupting the cascade: Orienting contributes to 
decision making even in the absence of visual stimulation. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 69(4), 591-5. 
Spezio, M. L., Adolphs, R., Hurley, R. S., & Piven, J. (2007). Analysis of face gaze in 
autism using "bubbles". Neuropsychologia, 45(1), 144-51. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.04.027 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   138 
Stewart, M. E., Barnard, L., Pearson, J., Hasan, R., & O'Brien, G. (2006). 
Presentation of depression in autism and Asperger syndrome: A review. 
Autism, 10(1), 103-116. doi:10.1177/1362361306062013 
Strick, M., Holland, R. W., & van Knippenberg, A. (2008). Seductive eyes: 
Attractiveness and direct gaze increase desire for associated objects. 
Cognition, 106(3), 1487-96. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.05.008 
Suchow, J. W. & Alvarez, G. A. (2011). Motion silences awareness of visual change. 
Current Biology, 21(2), 140-143. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2010.12.019 
Swanson, M. R. & Siller, M. (2013). Patterns of gaze behavior during an eye-tracking 
measure of joint attention in typically developing children and children with 
autism spectrum disorder. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 7(9), 
1087-1096. 
Swettenham, J., Plaisted, K., Milne, E., Campbell, R., Rosenfelder, D., & Coleman, 
M. (2001). Children with autism show subtle difficulties detecting eye 
direction. Paper Presented at the Annula Meeting of the Cognitive 
Neuroscience Society, New York, NY. 
Tewes, U. (1994). Hamburg-Wechsler-Intelligenztest für Erwachsene, Revision 1991. 
Bern: Huber. 
Theodoridou, A., Rowe, A. C., Penton-Voak, I. S., & Rogers, P. J. (2009). Oxytocin 
and social perception: Oxytocin increases perceived facial trustworthiness and 
attractiveness. Horm Behav, 56(1), 128-32. doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2009.03.019 
Vishwanath, A. (2003). Comparing online information effects: A cross-cultural 
comparison of online information and uncertainty avoidance. Communication 
Research, 30(6), 579-598. doi:10.1177/0093650203257838 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   139 
Vishwanath, A. (2004). Manifestations of interpersonal trust in online interaction A 
cross-cultural study comparing the differential utilization of seller ratings by 
ebay participants in canada, france, and germany. New Media & Society, 6(2), 
219-234. 
Vogeley, K. & Bente, G. (2010). "Artificial humans": Psychology and neuroscience 
perspectives on embodiment and nonverbal communication. Neural Networks, 
23(8-9), 1077-1090. doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2010.06.003 
Von Aster, M., Neubauer, A., & Horn, R. (2006). Wechsler Intelligenztest für 
Erwachsene (WIE). Deutschsprachige bearbeitung und adaption des WAIS-III 
von david wechsler. Frankfurt: Harcourt Test Services. 
Wallace, S., Coleman, M., Pascalis, O., & Bailey, A. (2006). A study of impaired 
judgment of eye-gaze direction and related face-processing deficits in autism 
spectrum disorders. Perception, 35(12), 1651-1664. doi:10.1068/p5442 
Webster, S. & Potter, D. D. (2011). Gaze perception develops atypically in children 
with autism. Child Development Research, 2011, 1-9. 
Wheelwright, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Goldenfeld, N., Delaney, J., Fine, D., Smith, R., et 
al. (2006). Predicting autism spectrum quotient (AQ) from the systemizing 
quotient-revised (SQ-R) and empathy quotient (EQ). Brain Research, 1079(1), 
47-56. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.012 
White, S., Hill, E., Winston, J., & Frith, U. (2006). An islet of social ability in 
Asperger syndrome: Judging social attributes from faces. Brain and 
Cognition, 61(1), 69-77. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2005.12.007 
Willis, J. & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions. Psychological Science, 17(7), 592-
598. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01750.x 
Using Avatars to Study Social Cognition 
 
	   140 
Wilms, M., Schilbach, L., Pfeiffer, U., Bente, G., Fink, G. R., & Vogeley, K. (2010). 
It's in your eyes--using gaze-contingent stimuli to create truly interactive 
paradigms for social cognitive and affective neuroscience. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, 5(1), 98-107. doi:10.1093/scan/nsq024 
Winston, J. S., O'Doherty, J., Kilner, J. M., Perrett, D. I., & Dolan, R. J. (2007). Brain 
systems for assessing facial attractiveness. Neuropsychologia, 45(1), 195-206. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.05.009 
Yamagishi, T. & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the united states 
and japan. Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 129-166. 
Zajonc, R. B. (2001). Mere exposure: A gateway to the subliminal. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 10(6), 224. doi:10.1111/1467-
8721.00154 
 
 
